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INTRODUCTION
Electronic databases1 provide information users with extraction tools enabling them to sort and arrange data in ways
meaningful to them; extending the manipulative abilities of
information users’ minds adds immense value to what
would otherwise be a mass of incoherent, disparate data.2
1. The European Database Directive defines a database as “a collection of
works, data or other independent materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way and capable of being accessed by electronic or other means.” Council
Directive No. 96/9, art. 1(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 24 (1996) [hereinafter Database Directive]. The Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of
1996 (“U.S. Proposal”) defines a database as “a collection, assembly or compilation, in any form or medium now or later known or developed, of works, data or
other materials, arranged in a systematic or methodical way.” H.R. REP. NO.
3531, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1996). The Draft Treaty on Intellectual Property
in Respect of Databases defines a database as “a collection of independent works,
data or other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way and capable
of being accessed by electronic or other means.” Diplomatic Conference on Certain
Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions, Draft Treaty on Intellectual Property in
Respect of Databases, art. 2(1) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996) [hereinafter WIPO Proposal]. Using the right collection tool, almost anything, including
numbers, text, audio, and images, can be reduced to binary form which can then
be compiled in a database. However, the U.S. and WIPO Proposal (“Proposals”)
exclude computer programs from their protection, and the Database Directive
excludes “computer programs used in the making or operation of databases accessible by electronic means” from its protection. See H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra, §
3(d); WIPO Proposal, supra, art. 1(4) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996);
Database Directive, supra, art. 1(3), O.J. L 77/20, at 24 (1996). In addition, the Database Directive and WIPO Proposal exclude certain dependent works. See Database Directive, supra, recital 17, O.J. L 77/20, at 21 (1996); WIPO Proposal, supra,
Notes § 2.03 WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996).
2. The value of the global information industry could reach $3 trillion dollars by the early 21st Century. Statement on Dismantling the U.S. Department of
Commerce: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Government Management, Information
and Technology of the House Comm. on Government Reform and Oversight, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Ronald H. Brown, Secretary of Commerce).
Note, however, that the “global information industry” referred to by the late Secretary Brown is much broader than the database market alone. A recent statement of the Co-Chair on High Performance Computing and Communications
valued the “information technology” sector at $500 billion. Prepared Statement on
Evolving the High Performance Computing and Communications Initiative to Support
the Nation’s Information Infrastructure: Testimony Before the Science Subcomm. on
Basic Research High Performance Computing and Communications Program of the
House Committee on High Performance Computing and Communications, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1995) (prepared statement of Ivan E. Sutherland, Ph.D., Co-Chair,
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Yet, in most of the world, these valuable business tools3
stand virtually naked in the marketplace,4 vulnerable to

Committee on High Performance Computing and Communications, and VicePresident, Sun Microsystems). When the European Community (“EC”) penned
its Initial Proposal for the legal protection of databases in 1992, the EC database
market was estimated at $10.2 billion, which amounted to approximately 30% of
the world market. W. Joseph Melnik, A Comparative Analysis for the Legal Protection of Computerized Databases: NAFTA vs. The European Communities, 26 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 57, 59 n.14 (1994).
3. See supra note 2 (discussing the dollar value of the information technology
market); J. H. Reichman, Electronic Information Tools: The Outer Edge of World Intellectual Property Law, 17 DAYTON L. REV. 797, 806 n.45 (1992); Database Directive,
supra note 1, recital 9, O.J. L 77/20, at 20 (1996) (“databases are a vital tool in the
development of an information market within the Community”); WIPO Proposal,
supra note 1, Preamble WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996) (“databases
are . . . an essential tool for promoting economic, cultural, and technological advancement”); see also 142 CONG. REC. E890-04 (daily ed. May 23, 1996) (statement
of Sen. Moorhead) (“[D]atabases are an essential tool for improving productivity,
advancing education and training, . . . creating a more informed citizenry[,
and] . . . are also the linchpin of a dynamic commercial industry in the United
States.”).
4. Databases, like most forms of intellectual property, are saddled with
“public goods” characteristics: they are indivisible, inexhaustible, and ubiquitous. See, e.g., J. H. Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy: Premises for a Restructured International Intellectual Property System, 13
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475, 486 (1995); see also J. H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 59 n.35 (1997); see
infra notes 5, 8-10 and accompanying text (discussing vulnerability of databases).
Practically speaking, this means that without some legal protection, parasitic
competitors can access, copy, rearrange, and market a competing database at a
fraction of the cost incurred by the original database maker. COMM. ON ISSUES IN
THE TRANSBORDER FLOW OF SCIENTIFIC DATA, U.S. NAT’L COMM. FOR CODATA,
COMM’N ON PHYSICAL SCIENCES, MATHEMATICS, AND APPLICATIONS, AND NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, BITS OF POWER: ISSUES IN GLOBAL ACCESS TO SCIENTIFIC DATA
1-52 (National Academy Press forthcoming 1997) [hereinafter GLOBAL ACCESS].
Although database makers can erect technological fences to protect their investments (e.g., encryption algorithms), those fences suffer limitations which render
them less than optimal as a means of protection. See, e.g., Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,
Property and Innovation in the Global Information Infrastructure, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 261, 288 (1996) (discussing market, technological, and legal limitations as tools
to protect intellectual property on the Internet). In addition, useable encryption
technology forces only the first purchaser to pay for a key to decrypt the encoded
information. Therefore, unless there is a fence, or other disincentive to prevent
the first purchaser from repackaging the database maker’s investment,
encryption suffers the same weakness as the two-party deal discussed infra in
Part I.
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parasitic competitors, users, and information Samaritans,5
unless the database maker renders the database less valuable, or more expensive,6 to the information user by creatively “selecting and arranging” enough disparate data to
erect the fence7 afforded by copyright,8 erects the two-party
5. Information Samaritans refers to parties who, for noneconomic reasons,
extract data from databases without paying the database maker and make it
freely available to the public. Cf. United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535,
536 (D. Mass. 1994). In LaMacchia, a federal grand jury indicted LaMacchia, a 21year-old M.I.T. student, for devising a scheme in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343
(West Supp. 1996), the wire fraud statute, to defraud software manufacturers and
vendors. Id. LaMacchia encouraged users to upload popular software and
games to an electronic bulletin he named Cynosure, and transferred the programs to a second location where users with access to the Cynosure password
could freely download the programs. Id. Because LaMacchia had apparently not
acted for the purposes of securing “commercial advantage or private financial
gain,” he could not be prosecuted under the criminal copyright statute, 17
U.S.C.A. § 506 (West Supp. 1996). Id. at 545; see also Copyright Law of the United
States of America, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (current version at 17
U.S.C.A. §§ 101-810 (West Supp. 1996)). Citing, among other factors, the failure
to allege violation of the criminal copyright statute, id. at 542-43, and relying
heavily on the reasoning of Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985), the district court granted LaMacchia’s motion to dismiss, but nonetheless noted that if
the indictment was true, LaMacchia’s behavior was “at best heedlessly irresponsible, and at worst . . . nihilistic, self-indulgent, and lacking in any fundamental
sense of values.” LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 545. This Article does not discuss
the conflicting policies presented by criminal prosecution of information Samaritans. See Teddy C. Kim, Taming the Electronic Frontier: Software Copyright Protection in the Wake of United States v. LaMacchia, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1255 (1996) (arguing that criminal prosecution of noncommercial copyright infringers is
inappropriate). However, this Article does proceed on the assumption that extracting data from databases and making it freely available, regardless of the motive for such behavior, destroys incentives to invest in database creation. See
GLOBAL ACCESS, supra note 4, at 8.
6. For example, to secure copyright protection, many database makers inject
“value-added” data, which increases the price of the database to the information
user without any corresponding increase in utility. See Jane C. Ginsburg, No
“Sweat”? Copyright & Other Protection Works of Information, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338,
344-47 (1992). The additional data adds “value” only in the sense that it enables
the database maker to secure some degree of copyright protection. Id. at 347.
7. Cf. Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner’s Dilemma in
Intellectual Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 853, 855 (1992) (noting that the right to
exclude afforded authors functions much in the same way as fences do for real
property owners).
8. Copyright generally protects only the creative selection and arrangement
of factual information. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
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wall afforded by contract,9 or is otherwise able to secure the
haphazard protection whimsically afforded by unfair competition law.10
Artistic Works of September 9, 1886, completed at Paris on May 4, 1896, revised
at Berlin on Nov. 13, 1908, completed at Berne on Mar. 20, 1914, revised at Rome
on June 2, 1928, revised at Brussels on June 26, 1948, and revised at Stockholm on
July 14, 1967 (with Protocol regarding developing countries), completed at
Stockholm on July 14, 1967, art. 2(5), 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention] (protecting collections of works, which by reason of selection and arrangement of their contents, constitute intellectual creations); 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 103
(West Supp. 1996) (protecting compilations of data that are selected, coordinated,
or arranged in such a way that the compilation constitutes an original work of
authorship). With regard to copyright protection, the Database Directive is in
accord. See Database Directive, supra note 1, recitals 15-16, O.J. L 77/20, at 21,
art. 3(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 25 (1996) (databases, which by reason of selection or arrangement of their contents constitute intellectual creations, shall be protected by
copyright); Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring
Rights Questions, Draft Treaty on New Copyright Developments, art. 5 WIPO
Doc. CRNR/DC/89 (Dec. 20, 1996) (compilations of data, which by reason of selection or arrangement of their contents, constitute intellectual creations are protected), adopted by Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring
Rights Questions, Geneva, Dec. 20, 1996; see also J. H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Under the TRIPs Component of the WTO
Agreement, 29 INT’L LAW. 345, 373 (1995) (noting that the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) fails to offer the protection provided by the Database Directive’s sui generis regime). But see Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act, 1988, 2 Eliz. 2, ch. 48, §§ 2-3 (Eng.) (protecting “sweat of
the brow” databases in the United Kingdom); Reichman, supra note 3, at 804 n.33
(citing W. R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
PATENTS, COPYRIGHT,
TRADEMARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS 268-69 (2d ed. 1989) for the United Kingdom’s
practice of extending copyright to small change literary productions provided
they exhibit “skill, judgment, and labor”); see also Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 372
n.161 (noting that the Nordic Catalogue Rule provides protection to unoriginal
compilations for 10 years). The Database Directive permits derogation from its
terms so that databases protected under less-exacting EC copyright regimes on
the Database Directive’s effective date will continue to enjoy that protection until
their term expires. Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 14(2), O.J. L 77/20, at 27
(1996); cf. WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 7(3) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug.
30, 1996) (rights granted by treaty are independent of any protection afforded to
the database maker by national legislation). Similarly, the sui generis rights
granted by the three regimes are without prejudice to any other rights. See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 13, O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996); H.R. REP. NO. 3531,
supra note 1, § 9 (c); WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 10(2) WIPO Doc.
CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996).
9. See generally JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 4, 9 (3d
ed. 1987).
10. J. H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms,
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Recognizing the need for a “stable and uniform legal protection regime” to stimulate database creation in the European Community (“EC”),11 the EC struck out boldly by erecting a toll fence12 to protect the investment of database
94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2476 (1994) (noting that the development of unfair competition proceeds on a “hit-or-miss basis that varies with the outlook of single
judges . . . [without any] well-defined objects of protection, . . . standards of eligibility, and [with] few safeguards to protect the interests of all concerned”).
11. Database Directive, supra note 1, recital 12, O.J. L 77/20, at 20 (1996).
The United States’ share of the database market is approximately twice the EC’s
market share. See Explanatory Statement at COM(92)24 final-SYN 393 accompanying the Council Directive Initial Proposal, art. 8, O.J. C 156/03, at 9 (1992)
[hereinafter Initial Proposal]; see also Debra B. Rosler, The European Union’s Proposed Directive for the Legal Protection of Databases: A New Threat to the Free Flow of
Information, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 105, 109-10 (1995) (explaining that Great Britain
garners approximately 65% of the revenues from the EC database market). Is it
merely a coincidence that the two countries with the biggest database market
share, the United States and Great Britain, have historically protected “noncreative” labors of database makers through “sweat of the brow” and “industrious
collection” rationales? See Pamela Samuelson, Missing Foundations of The Proposed European Database Directive (1994) (on file with Professor Jerome H.
Reichman, Vanderbilt University School of Law). For a comparison of the two
rationales, compare Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright
Protection for Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865 (1990) (discussing
United States “sweat of the brow” rationale) with Colin Tapper, An Aspect of
Copyright in Data Bases, 14 N. KY. L. REV. 169 (1987) (explaining Great Britain’s
“industrious collection” rationale). But see Mark Powell, The European Union’s
Database Directive: An International Antidote to the Side-Effects of Feist?, in 3
FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW & POLICY (Hugh C. Hansen ed., forthcoming 1997) (citing the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs opinion that “the economic situation in the database
sector is such that urgent actions are not as yet required”).
12. Cf. Gordon, supra note 7, at 855. Gordon argues that groups seeking new
fences “should be prepared to show that their current fences are inadequate to
provide adequate incentives.” Id. To justify their need for a new fence, database
makers need only point to Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499
U.S. 340 (1991), and its implications. See Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 343
(“Feist . . . calls into question the ability of copyright . . . to secure meaningful
coverage to those compilations that do meet the initial test of copyrightablity.”).
In Feist, the United States Supreme Court cloaked free riders who appropriate
the “noncreative” labors of data collectors with constitutional protection by endorsing the thin copyright doctrine. Feist, 499 U.S. at 357-59. Apparently, only
the creative selection and arrangement of facts deserve copyright protection.
Unfortunately, for many database makers, the exercise of creativity in the selection and arrangement of data is constrained by societal expectations, notions of
functionality, and “user-friendliness” considerations. See Ginsburg, supra note 6,
at 343; Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protec-
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makers.13 Emboldened by, or perhaps scurrying to catch up
with,14 the vanguard approach15 embodied in the EC’s Database Directive,16 the United States and the World Intellectual
Property Organization (“WIPO”) have proposed similar protection for these valuable business tools.17 Like the Database
Directive, the United States and WIPO proposals (“Proposals”), respectively known as the Database Investment and Intellectual Property and Antipiracy Act of 1996 (“H.R. 3531”
or “U.S. Proposal”)18 and the Draft Treaty on Intellectual
tion of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLO. L. REV. 516, 527-30 (1981).
13. The Database Directive extends copyright protection to “authors” of databases, Database Directive, supra note 1, arts. 3-5, O.J. L 77/20, at 25 (1996), but
extends sui generis protection to a broader group: database makers. Id. art. 7(1),
O.J. L 77/20, at 25 (1996). The Database Directive defines database makers as
those who take the “initiative and risk of investing.” Id. recital 41, O.J. L 77/20,
at 23 (1996). Unlike the Database Directive, which leaves ownership of employee-made databases up to national legislation, see id. recital 29, O.J. L 77/20,
at 22 (1996), both the U.S. and WIPO Proposals define database maker in such a
way as to preclude employees and subcontractors from gaining ownership
rights. See H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 2; WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art.
2(3) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996) (database maker is the person with
control and responsibility for the undertaking of a substantial investment). This
Article does not address the copyright protection afforded database makers by
the Database Directive. Id. art. 7(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 25 (1996).
14. See Paul Waterschoot, An Overview of Recent Developments in Intellectual
Property in the European Union, in 3 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW & POLICY, supra note 11 (explaining that the Database Directive
“has placed the Community far ahead of its partners”); 142 CONG. REC. E890-04
(daily ed. May 23, 1996) (statement of Sen. Moorhead) (explaining that the “Directive could place U.S. firms at an enormous competitive disadvantage
throughout the entire European market”).
15. See Powell, supra note 11, at 50 n.2 (noting that the EC’s “vanguard approach to the legal protection of databases” parallels the United States’ adoption
of a sui generis regime, the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (1984) (codified as amended at § 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-914
(West Supp. 1996)), to protect semiconductors).
16. Council Directive No. 96/9, O.J. L 77/20 (1996). The Database Directive
can be logically divided into three sections: Articles 3-6 govern the copyrightability of databases; Articles 7-11 govern the sui generis extraction and reutilization rights; and Articles 1, 2, and 12-16 are common provisions applicable to
both bundles of rights. See generally Council Directive No. 96/9, O.J. L 77/20
(1996). This Article does not address the copyright provisions of the Database
Directive.
17. See supra note 1-2.
18. H.R. REP. NO. 3531, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996).
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Property in Respect of Databases (“WIPO Proposal”),19
would create sui generis regimes20 protecting investment, as
such, in databases.
Some commentators argue that the Database Directive,
and the Proposals it has spawned, are arguably the “most
deviant” examples of the trend toward sui generis protection
for intellectual property falling between the cracks of the
mature paradigms of patent and copyright.21 These commentators also argue that the Database Directive is “one of
the least balanced and most potentially anti-competitive intellectual property [regimes] ever created,”22 and join others
who argue that the Database Directive will stifle access to information, retard competition in the database industry, and
impede basic scientific research.23
This Article argues that the Database Directive’s sui
generis regime, at least with respect to publicly or privately19. Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights
Questions, Draft Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Databases, WIPO
Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996).
20. Intellectual property laws protecting subject matter outside the scope of
the mature intellectual property paradigms of patent and copyright law are
commonly deemed “sui generis.” See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 6
n.6 (citations omitted). Sui generis literally means “of its own class.” See BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1434 (6th ed. 1990).
21. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 53-54; see generally
Reichman, supra note 10, at 2453-99 (discussing legal regimes protecting intellectual property falling between the cracks of the mature patent and copyright
paradigms); Reichman, supra note 4, at 517 (suggesting the need for a new intellectual property paradigm, not based upon exclusive property rights, that “looks
beyond art and inventions . . . [and] deal[s] directly with the pervasive threat of
market failure facing investors in unpatentable, noncopyrightable innovation”).
22. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 79.
23. See Rosler, supra note 11, at 146; Charles Von Simson, Feist or Famine:
American Database Copyright as an Economic Model for the European Union, 20
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 729, 766-68 (1995); Letter from Bruce Alberts et al., President,
National Academy of Sciences, to Michael Kantor, Secretary of Commerce (Oct.
9, 1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter “Academy Letter”]; Reichman &
Samuelson, supra note 4, at 55; GLOBAL ACCESS, supra note 4, at 35. “Basic research” seeks to further scientific knowledge for its own sake, without regard to
specific applications. See NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, SCIENCE & ENGINEERING
INDICATORS 4-9 (15th ed. 1996).
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available data (“nonproprietary data”),24 serves some of the
same procompetitive functions as does the law of trade secrets25 without requiring secrecy.26 While this Article recognizes that the Database Directive’s sui generis regime could
result in de facto “fact monopolies,” or otherwise enable database makers to charge monopoly rents for sole-source or
proprietary data,27 this Article argues that ameliorative
measures available in the EC are sufficient to enable competition, the ultimate guardian of consumers in market economies,28 to perform its protective role in the EC, even in the
case of sole-source data. However, the lack of an international competition law or other international sword,29 which
24. Nonproprietary data are data that can be independently generated, collected, or obtained from more than one source. Compare Initial Proposal, supra
note 11, art. 8, O.J. C 156/03, at 9 (1992) with Council Directive Amended Proposal, art. 11, O.J. C 308/01, at 13-14 (1993) [hereinafter Amended Proposal] (defining “sole-source data” as data that cannot be “independently created, collected
or obtained from any other source”).
25. See ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454-55 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing
Rockwell Graphic Sys. v. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991)); cf.
Reichman, supra note 10, at 2439-40.
26. Under the Database Directive, second comers seeking to extract data
from a protected database must either obtain a license from the database maker
to extract the data, or independently generate the data. See infra notes 244-54 and
accompanying text; cf. Reichman, supra note 10, at 2438-40 (noting that trade secret laws force second comers to license unpatentable know-how or to obtain the
know-how by proper means); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490
(1974) (noting that trade secret law does not forbid independent creation, reverse
engineering, or other fair and honest means).
27. See supra note 24 (defining “nonproprietary data”).
28. As the Supreme Court has explained: “Basic to the faith that a free
economy best promotes the public wealth is that goods must stand the cold test
of competition; that the public, acting through the market’s impersonal judgment, shall allocate the Nation’s resources and thus direct the course its economic development will take . . . .” Jefferson Parrish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,
12 (1984) (quoting Time-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594,
605 (1953)); see also Digital Equip. v. Uniq Digital Technologies, 73 F.3d 756, 762
(7th Cir. 1996) (“Competition among manufacturers fully protects buyers who
accurately calculate life-cycle costs.”); cf. Rockwell Graphic Sys., 925 F.2d. at 180
(discussing importance of trade secrets to preserve competition in intellectual
property); Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d at 1453 (“Competition among vendors . . . is how
consumers are protected in a market economy.”).
29. See Eleanor M. Fox, Trade, Competition, and Intellectual Property—TRIPS
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would enable fair followers30 to compete directly, or indirectly with sole-source database makers in value-added
markets, suggests a need to build a limitation into any international sui generis regime protecting investment in databases.31
This Article discusses and analyzes the EC Database Directive’s sui generis regime,32 which, unlike copyright law,
casts its protection based upon economic principles, rather
than broad cultural policies.33 Part I examines briefly the
general characteristics of the database markets and the protection afforded databases by existing legal regimes. Part II
compares the substantive provisions of the Database Directive and the Proposals. Part III analyzes the Database Directive’s sui generis regime, using the factual background of
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,34 a case whose facts demonstrate
the vulnerability of databases to parasitic behavior, and concludes that the Directive adequately balances the public’s
need for information access with the need for production incentives within the EC.
and its Antitrust Counterparts, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 481, 485-91 (1996) (discussing the significant differences in the world’s two prominent competition law
systems: European community competition law and United States antitrust
law). For an analysis of the interaction between EC competition law and intellectual property law, see Jan Corbet, The Law of the EEC and Intellectual Property, 13
J.L. & COM. 327 (1994).
30. Cf. J. R. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition
Under the TRIPS Agreement, N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. (forthcoming 1997).
31. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
32. See supra notes 1, 16.
33. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
429 (1984) (explaining that copyright law makes economic reward secondary to
the higher public purpose of providing the public access to the author’s creative
genius) (citations omitted); see also Reichman, supra note 10, at 2452-53 (noting
that copyright promotes cultural policies at the expense of efficient allocation of
resources); see also Pamela Samuelson, Comments on Gerald Dworkin’s Article on
Copyright, Patent or Protection for Computer Programs, in 1 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW & POLICY 183 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 1996)
(noting that the Database Directive is based upon “competition policy, rather
than on the . . . Romantic concepts of authorship embedded in . . . Continental
European [copyright]”).
34. 908 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis. 1996), rev’d, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
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Part IV argues that the Database Directive’s sui generis
regime would, if modified by incorporating a compulsory license35 loosely modeled on the compulsory license United
States copyright mandates for musical works,36 provide a
sufficiently pro-competitive international model to protect
the public’s interest in competition in the information market. So modified, the Database Directive’s sui generis regime
would permit fair followers to follow by honest means,
while protecting the “sweat of the brow” intellectual efforts37
and investments of database makers. Part IV then discusses
the risks and opportunities to researchers who currently operate in noncompetitive, information-subsidized environments. Finally, this Article concludes by suggesting that a
sui generis regime protecting investment in databases could

35. See Initial Proposal, supra note 11, art. 8, O.J. C 156/03, at 9 (1992);
Amended Proposal, supra note 24, art. 11, O.J. C 308/01, at 13-14 (1993) (mandating compulsory licenses on “fair and nondiscriminatory terms” in the case of
sole-source data); cf. Reichman, supra note 10, at 2539-44 (proposing off-the-rack
liability regime with built-in compulsory license); see also Pamela Samuelson et
al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection Of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 2308 (1994); cf. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 81 (proposing short
period of pro-competitive lead-time followed by an automatic license).
36. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 115.
37. Notwithstanding Feist’s epistemologically erroneous incantation that
facts merely exist and await discovery, and therefore cannot be original, Feist,
499 U.S. at 347-48, the author’s contributions are no more original than the researcher’s contributions: both translate and recombine data from the public domain. See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1016 (1990) (arguing that facts do not exist until researchers “sift through available evidence,
design new avenues of inquiry, choose among a myriad of conflicting indicia,
and supply interpretive paradigms”); see also Wendy J. Gordon, Reality as Artifact: From Feist to Fair Use, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93 (1992); cf. Zechariah
Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 511 (1945)
(explaining that authors stand on the shoulders of the cultural giant). The analytical soundness of this conceptual truism is demonstrated by the narrow scope
afforded Feist. See, e.g., CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports,
Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the selection and arrangement of
used car valuations was creative), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 72 (1995); Key Publications v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enters., 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that the selection of businesses to be included in a telephone directory was
creative); Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that
the selection of categories in creating a baseball pitching form was creative).
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effect a subtle, and perhaps favorable, shift in societal resources from the pursuit of entertainment to the pursuit of
knowledge.
I. DATABASE PROTECTION UNDER EXISTING LEGAL REGIMES
Although most databases find some degree of protection
under the veil of copyright law, between the two-party wall
afforded by contract, or within the whimsical embrace of unfair competition law, many commentators agree that these
legal regimes, both singularly and collectively, fail to provide protection adequate to ensure the certainty of return on
investment required to enhance and stimulate worldwide
production of databases.38 To reveal the gap-filling func38. See, e.g., Statement on the NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1997) (statement of Barbara A. Munder, Senior Vice
President, McGraw-Hill Companies, testifying on behalf of the Information Industry Association “IIA”) (“Information is literally and figuratively at the heart
of the National Information Infrastructure. . . .”); id. (“[W]ithout effective protection, [producers of information content] cannot risk . . . investment in cyberspace
where it is so easy to copy, retransmit and alter our property without our permission, and often without our knowledge.”). The Information Industry Association is a trade association of 550 companies that provides information products and services on a worldwide basis. See Bradford L. Smith, Creating the Global
Information Society: Looking Ahead, in 2 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW & POLICY (Hugh C. Hansen ed., forthcoming 1997); Reichman &
Samuelson, supra note 4, at 7; Denicola, supra note 12, at 528-30; Ginsburg, supra
note 6, at 340-42; Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright in Electronic Maps, 35 JURIMETRICS J.
395, 396 (1995) (arguing that a new approach, which may require either amending the Copyright Act or adopting a sui generis database protection statute, is
needed to protect electronic maps); see also Database Directive, supra note 1, recital 12, O.J. L 77/20, at 20 (1996); WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, Note 1.05 WIPO
Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996) (“[C]ontinued investment . . . in the development and refinement of databases . . . will not take place unless a stable and uniform regime of legal protection is established . . . .”); cf. 142 CONG. REC. E890-04
(daily ed. May 23, 1996) (statement of Sen. Moorhead) (introducing H.R. 3531 to
“encourage continued investment in the production and distribution of valuable
new databases”); cf. Rosler, supra note 11, at 107 (the inherent vulnerability of
electronic databases amplifies the need for economic protection while preserving
the “free flow of information”); Dennis S. Karjala, Misappropriation as a Third Intellectual Property Paradigm, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2594, 2595 (1994) [hereinafter Karjala
II] (suggesting a new approach to prohibit methods of acquiring information
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tions that could be served by a sui generis regime designed to
protect the investments of database makers, this part briefly
examines various “database markets.” This part then explores the relative strengths and weaknesses of existing legal
regimes that afford some protection to these valuable business tools.
A. General Characteristics of the Splintered Database Markets
Databases, and their respective commercial markets, vary
as much as the needs and capabilities of the information
consumers patronizing the database market.39 Although the
commercial “database market” is difficult to define, the
competitive battle for the information user’s patronage appears to be waged in at least three somewhat distinct, but
overlapping, markets: the “one-stop-shopping” market; the
“problem-focused” market; and the “industry-focused” market.40
which, if permitted, would result in disincentives to create desirable works). The
failure of existing legal regimes to adequately protect database makers can be
partially attributed to the peculiar characteristics of information: “a commodity . . . particularly embarrassing for the achievement of optimal allocation.” See
W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 831-32 (2d ed.
1995) (quoting Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources
to Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 620 (National
Bureau of Economic Research ed., 1962)). That is, optimal information utilization
occurs when information is free, while optimal information production occurs
only when producers expect to appropriate the economic value of their investments. Id.
39. Databases range in size and complexity from the Internet, which is conceptually a database, to the Medicare and Medicaid Guide (CCH), a compilation
of general and specific information relating to health care law, available in paper
and electronic form, to simple tables of information.
40. Lloyd A. Fletcher, Searcher, INFO. TODAY, Sept. 1, 1995, available in Westlaw, Allnewsplus File; Telephone Interview with Anne Griffith, Senior Research
Analyst at the Software Publishers Association, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 8, 1996)
[hereinafter “Griffith Interview”] (explaining that the database market consists of
many niche markets). Examples of databases serving the broader market include
NEXIS (current and archived news and information) and ProQuest Direct (journals, newspapers, and dissertation abstracts).
FRED NEVIN, BUSINESS
INFORMATION MARKETS 1999: THE STRATEGIC OUTLOOK 67-77 (Lorraine Sileo et al.
eds., 1996 COWLES/SIMBA INFORMATION). Business databases generally fall in
seven topical areas (listed in descending market share order): financial (real-
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Database vendors in the “one-stop-shopping” market offer general information content to a broad customer base.41
In contrast, database vendors in the “problem-focused” market offer specific information content, focused on particular
problems, to industry-wide groups,42 while database vendors in the “industry-focused” market offer both general and
specific information content to specific industry and professional markets such as medical, legal, government, public relations, and news.43
Generally speaking, database vendors offering general
information content serve a broad market and incur lower
data collection costs, which permits those database vendors
to charge lower fees while remaining competitive.44 Conversely, because database vendors offering highly specialized information content generally serve a narrower market
and incur higher data collection costs, those database makers
typically charge higher fees to earn a return on their investment.45 As a result, information users seeking specialized intime and historical), marketing, credit, research, market-specific, legal/tax/public records, and general and business news. Id.
41. See Fletcher, supra note 40 (noting that even within the broader market
each vendor has its own relative subject matter strengths).
42. Id. (citing LEXIS/NEXIS and Knight-Ridder’s Business-Base as examples); see also NEVIN, supra note 40, at 72 (listing Telerate as a provider of a database focusing on the price of government securities and bonds).
43. Fletcher, supra note 40 (citing LEXIS/NEXIS’ AnswerPaks and KRI’s
Science-Base as examples); see also NEVIN, supra note 40, at 75-76 (listing Equifax
Insurance Information Services (insurance industry), T/SF Communications
(trucking industry), and ARI Network Services (agriculture and environmental)
as providers of market-specific databases).
44. Griffith Interview, supra note 40; see also Perritt, supra note 4, at
45. Griffith Interview, supra note 40 (noting other factors driving costs in
specialized markets such as increased collection costs because data are not as
widely available, and higher data maintenance costs associated with dynamic
data).
the cost of originating intellectual property can be expressed as:
co = cc + cc + cm + cr where cc is the cost of creation, e.g. payments to
the author; cc is the cost of . . . preparing the information for publication; cm is the cost of marketing, including promotional expenses, distribution costs and costs of billing and collecting; and cr is the cost of
copying (reproduction).
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formation will generally pay a higher price than information
users seeking general information.46
Information users also generally find pricing structure
variations within each market segment.47 For example, subscription models may charge a basic fee for unlimited access,48 or a basic fee for a fixed level of access plus an additional time-based fee for access beyond the fixed level.49
Transactional pricing models may charge based upon the
number of searches performed or upon the volume of information retrieved or extracted.50 Other pricing models allow free public access to a certain amount of information,
and restrict access to more specialized information to paid
subscribers.51 Finally, some pricing models incorporate features of both the subscription and transaction models52 and
permit the information user to choose the pricing scheme
that maximizes usability while minimizing costs.53
Perritt, supra note 4, at
46. Griffith Interview, supra note 40; Perritt, supra note 4, at 276
47. See Perritt, supra note 4, at
(describing various pricing options available through Westlaw).
48. For example, CD-ROM subscriptions typically provide unlimited access
to an optical disk, along with periodic updates, for a fixed fee; CCH CD-ROM
and Online for Windows (CCH) offers the Medicare and Medicaid Guide along
with various other health law materials on optical disk with monthly updates;
and local Internet access providers, as well as some centralized dial-up services
such as America Online, offer an option for purchasing unlimited access.
49. Griffith Interview, supra note 40. For example, the CCH product noted
above offers access to an accompanying online service, charged on an hourly basis, that provides access to the latest health and tax law materials. See supra note
48.
50. Id.
51. For example, Environmental RouteNet, a service offered by Cambridge
Scientific, focuses on environmental information. Routenet also engages in price
discrimination: individual users may access for $50 per month, while institutional prices start at $8,000 per year for eight users. See Paul Blake, Database Traditionals Get Caught Up in the Web, INFO. TODAY, Sept. 1, 1995, available in Westlaw,
Allnewsplus File; see also United States Courts Southern District of Texas (visited
May 6, 1997) <http://www.txs.uscourts.gov> (permitting free access to certain
data via the Internet but imposing time-based fees via a stand alone BBS
(PACER) for other data).
52. Examples include LEXIS/NEXIS and Westlaw.
53. Id.; see also John B. Kennedy & Shoshana R. Dweck, Publishers, Authors
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Although variations in the database market structure and
price models may reflect some degree of competition,54
commentators have noted that the market operates at a
suboptimal level because of the failure of existing legal regimes to protect adequately the investment required to produce valuable, commercial databases.55
B. Protection Afforded Database Makers by Existing Legal
Regimes
Database makers and rightholders56 seeking to market
their databases can obtain some degree of protection from
existing legal regimes.57 This section briefly explores, in
Battle Over Electronic Rights, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 28, 1996, at C17 (noting that publishers are experimenting with tiered subscriptions, per-article, and time-based pricing mechanisms).
54. But see Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 69 (noting that anecdotal
evidence suggests that database markets are “almost universally characterized
by a distinct absence of competition”). While this proposition may be true of
markets dominated by database makers who are also the sole source for the data
sought, the pricing options available to customers seeking the same type of information, see supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text, the high level of merger
and acquisition activity in the business database market, and falling operating
margins, indicate some level of competition in the database market. See NEVIN,
supra note 40, at 81.
55. See supra notes 5, 8; Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 55 (noting
that the risk of market failure tends to keep the production of information goods
at suboptimal levels); see also Reichman, supra note 10, at 2491 (noting that copyright’s creativity requirement could “exclude many of the most commercially
and scientifically important databases”).
56. Rights under the three sui generis regimes initially vest in the database
maker, but are freely transferable thereafter. See Database Directive, supra note 1,
art. 7(3), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996); WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 4(2) WIPO
Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996); H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 2 (defining
“database owner”).
57. Database makers not seeking to market their databases who also keep
their databases confidential might obtain trade secret protection. See, e.g., Mississippi Uniform Trade Secrets Act, MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-26-1 to -19 (1996);
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-194, 110 Stat. 3488 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1831-1839 (West Supp. 1996)) (making theft of trade secrets
a federal crime); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW §§ 39-45
(1995). Database makers may also benefit from criminal laws designed to deter
computer-related crime. See Rosler, supra note 11, at 131 (stating that such laws
have been enacted in 49 states).
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turn, the strengths and weaknesses of copyright, contract,
and unfair competition law, three regimes that offer some
protection to databases published in the marketplace.58
1. Protection Afforded by Copyright
One might expect that copyright, an institution designed
to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”59
would embrace a form of intellectual property with the potential to enhance access to, and increase the availability of,
information.60 Indeed, databases whose final form exhibits
creative selection and arrangement61 secure protection
“against the world.”62 However, as courts and commentators have recognized, the protection afforded by copyright
law to databases, except in a few European countries,63 consists of little more than a thin veil that quickly unravels as
content becomes more factual and necessary.64
Some commentators have noted that creatively selecting
and arranging a database may reduce data availability and
accessibility.65 For example, creatively selecting data ex-

58. In addition, the so-called Nordic “catalogue rule” protects “catalogues,
tables, and similar compilations in which a large number of particulars have
been summarized, including databases, for ten years after first publication.” See
Reichman, supra note 10, at 2492-93 (quoting Gunnar Karnell, The Nordic Catalogue Rule, in PROTECTING WORKS OF FACT 67-68 (E. J. Dommering & P. B. Hugenholtz eds., 1991)) (internal quotes omitted).
59. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
60. Paradoxically, this very purpose is often cited as the basis for limiting
copyright in factual information. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 354 (“Throughout history,
copyright law has recognized a greater need to disseminate factual works . . . .”)
(citation omitted).
61. See supra note 8.
62. See Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d at 1454.
63. See supra note 8.
64. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyrights’ Incentive Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 567-71 (1996) (discussing copyright’s questionable
premise that by limiting the scope of protection for necessary works, society will
have greater access to such works); see supra notes 5, 12.
65. See Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 347-49; Denicola, supra note 12, at 530; see
supra note 38.
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cludes potentially desirable information,66 while creatively
arranging data, assuming arrangement is not functionallydictated, may frustrate information users.67 In addition, because many database makers add superfluous original,
value-added data in an attempt to avail themselves of the
cloak of copyright, the selection and arrangement criteria
may increase the cost of databases without providing corresponding gains to database users.68
Other commentators have recognized that because copyright rests in a large degree upon broad cultural policies, and
not upon general economic considerations, copyright is illsuited to protect functional business tools like databases that
compete in the general market.69 That is, by linking the existence and degree of protection to the superficial final form of
the product, rather than to total production costs, copyright
fails to offer sufficient production incentives to encourage
production of these valuable business tools,70 and effectively
excludes “many of the most commercially and scientifically
important databases.”71
Copyright, then, leaves databases whose content is factual or necessary or is otherwise considered noncreative (especially comprehensive, electronic databases that defer
66. See Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 344-45 (noting that the selection criterion
discourages comprehensive data collections); see also Reichman, supra note 10, at
2491.
67. See Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 344-45. Consequently, electronic database
makers often forego imposition of selection and arrangement criteria in favor of
permitting users to dynamically impose their own selection and arrangement
criteria. Id.
68. Id. at 344-46.
69. Cf. Reichman, supra note 10, at 2452-53 (noting that copyright promotes
certain cultural policies at the expense of economic efficiency); Reichman, supra
note 3, at 806 n.45 (copyright deliberately subordinates the price-setting function
of the market to broader cultural policies); see Denicola, supra note 12, at 516 (noting that “the very vocabulary of copyright law is ill-suited to analyze property
rights in works of nonfiction[,]” such as databases).
70. See Denicola, supra note 12, at 530.
71. See Reichman, supra note 10, at 2491 (creativity requirement could exclude many of the most commercially and scientifically important databases).
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completely to the information consumer’s judgment regarding data arrangement and selection)72 exposed to parasitic
competitors and information Samaritans who extract and recompile the raw, unfiltered data to produce competing
products.73
2. Protection Afforded by Contract
Through mutually beneficial exchanges, contracts permit
the private ordering of resources (risk-allocation) essential to
the efficient functioning of a market economy.74 Database
makers can obtain differing degrees of contractual protection, depending on whether they make the database publicly
available or keep it under private control.75
The limits of contractual protection for publicly-available
databases are apparent after considering that unlike a copyright, which is enforceable against the world,76 a contract is
enforceable only against the contracting parties.77 Thus,
72. See Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 345 (computerized databases are designed
to permit users to impose their own arrangement and selection criteria).
73. See Reichman, supra note 10, at 2490-91. Information Samaritans might
distribute the data and effectively destroy a large portion of the maker’s market,
while parasitic competitors (“pirates”) might compete head-to-head with the database maker, or might produce and market a value-added product before the
maker produces the product. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 67-68. In
the latter case, the pirate might capitalize on advantages otherwise held by the
maker; e.g., established database makers have production facilities, managerial
experience, distribution channels, and reputational advantages. See Perritt, supra
note 4, at 279 (noting some of the market-related phenomena which tend to reduce the pirate’s ability to compete head-to-head with the maker).
74. See Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d at 1455 (citing American Airlines v. Wolens, 513
U.S. 219, 115 S. Ct. 817, 824-26 (1995); see generally 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.3, at 153-54 n.1 (2d ed. 1990).
75. See GLOBAL ACCESS, supra note 4, at 7-8 (discussing relative vulnerabilities of public and private databases). As used herein, “publicly-available” means
that the database or its contents are physically available to the public in paper or
electronic form.
76. See Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d at 1454.
77. See generally JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS (3d ed.
1987).
Although today’s technology permits preapproved computer-tocomputer transactions with no human interaction, Stewart I. Edelstein, Litigating
in Cyberspace: Contracts on the Internet, TRIAL, Oct. 1996, at 16, “effective contract
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unless the database maker can restrict redistribution, or control access to the database contents through technological
mechanisms, publicly-available databases are susceptible to
extraction and redistribution by parasitic competitors and information Samaritans who are not parties to the contract.78
On the other hand, privately-controlled databases—those
databases to which access is restricted79—enable database
makers to “track and charge for every instance of electronic
access.”80 Although such a database maker can theoretically
“reject the state-imposed cultural bargain”81 of copyright law
and “impose monopoly prices and potentially oppressive
terms on users,”82 there are several practical limits on her
ability to do so.
First, unless the database consists of sole-source data,83
which in some cases could trigger antitrust scrutiny,84 the
database maker faces the threat of market competition. Second, database makers who make their product available
only through telecommunications devices necessarily limit
their market to those with access to such devices.85
protection for content . . . [providers] is . . . problematic” on open (public) systems like the World Wide Web because “the transaction costs of effective negotiations are high.” See Perritt, supra note 4, at 290-91.
78. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 65-68 (discussing the vulnerability of publicly-available databases); see also supra note 5 (discussing and
defining “information Samaritan”).
79. For example, access could be restricted by limiting distribution to contracting parties via an electronic bulletin board or by other technological means
such as encryption devices. See supra note 4
80. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 70.
81. Id.
82. Id. Note that the Database Directive voids contracts that violate certain
user rights. See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 15, O.J. L 77/20, at 27
(1996); see also infra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 24.
84. See, e.g., John R. Wilke, FTC Charges ADP Formed a Monopoly in the Junk
Business, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1996, at A4 (reporting that the Federal Trade
Commission filed suit against ADP for allegedly forming an information monopoly); see infra notes 136, 201.
85. For example, although the Internet operates in over 75 countries, it
reaches only approximately 25 million people who access the Internet via approximately two million personal computers. See Charles Clark, The Copyright
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Third, contracts provide protection to databases, whether
publicly-available or privately-controlled, only if the parties
voluntarily abide by the contractual terms, or if the contractual terms are otherwise enforced by the judicial machinery.86 Commercially-minded courts have recognized that
enforcing private agreements is fundamental to market efficiency and stability,87 and that the enforcement of private
agreements respecting intellectual property serves the “same
procompetitive functions as does the law of trade secrets.”88
However, some courts have saddled the “unruly horse” of
public policy89 and rejected the efforts of intellectual property producers to protect by contract that which copyright
fails to protect.90
Contracts, then, leave databases exposed to parasitic
competitors and information Samaritans not in privity of
contract with the database maker,91 and to the risk that a
particular court will, on public policy grounds, refuse to enforce a private contractual agreement regarding databases.92
3. Protection Afforded by Unfair Competition Law
Database makers who fail to obtain adequate protection
from copyright and contract can sometimes obtain protection from the misappropriation branch of unfair competition
Environment for the Publisher in the Digital World 18 (visited May 11, 1997)
<http://www.grainger.uiuc.edu/icsu/clark.htm>.
86. See, e.g., 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 1.1, at 4
n.1 (2d ed. 1990) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) (“A contract is a promise or set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy . . . .”).
87. American Airlines, 115 S. Ct. at 826.
88. See Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d at 1455.
89. See 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 5.2, at 8 n.1
(2d ed. 1990) (quoting Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229, 252, 130 Eng. Rep. 294,
303 (1824)); cf. Zeidenberg 908 F. Supp. at 657-59.
90. See, e.g., ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis.), rev’d, 86
F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
91. Perritt, supra note 4, at 292 (“contract protection is unavailable except
when privity of contract exists”).
92. See supra notes 89-90.
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law.93 The tort of misappropriation protects investors from
the malcompetitive behavior of free-riding competitors.94
Unfortunately, the aegis of unfair competition law ebbs
and flows with the tide, a tide that follows not the moon, but
the sub rosa principles held by individual judges.95 The resulting unpredictability of the remedy renders unfair competition law less than an optimal means of protecting and
stimulating investment in databases.96
Unfair competition law, then, while affording some protection to database makers from malcompetitive free riders,97 does not protect database makers from information
Samaritans,98 and does not, because of the uncertainty of a
remedy, provide a predictable basis upon which to make an
investment decision.99
93. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (giving
birth to the tort of misappropriation in the United States); Denicola, supra note
12, at 517 n.7 (collecting cases).
94. See C. Owen Paepke, An Economic Interpretation of the Misappropriation
Doctrine: Common Law Protection for Investments in Innovation, 2 HIGH TECH. L.J.
55, 68-69 (1987) (describing three common elements as: (1) investment by the
plaintiff in creating a product; (2) use of that investment or product in competition with the plaintiff; and (3) commercial damage to the plaintiff); Reichman &
Samuelson, supra note 4, at 132 (citing domestic and foreign authorities recognizing the tort); Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition Law § 38. But see Gary
Myers, The Restatement’s Rejection of the Misappropriation Tort: A Victory for the
Public Domain, 47 S.C. L. REV. 673, 678 (1996) (arguing that the Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition Law rejects the tort of misappropriation as an independent cause of action).
95. See Reichman, supra note 10, at 2476.
96. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 131; Paepke, supra note 94, at 6870 (noting that the tort lacks consistent formulation and application).
97. Id.; see supra note 93 (citing INS and a source collecting cases following
the INS rationale).
98. But see Paepke, supra note 94, at 68-69 (noting that some courts have
eliminated the element of competition); see generally RALPH S. BROWN & ROBERT C.
DENICOLA, CASES ON COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND OTHER TOPICS
BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND ARTISTIC WORKS 580-83
(6th ed. 1995) (describing the reception and evolution of INS in the federal
courts).
99. See Samuelson, supra note 11, at 9 (noting that the drafters of the Initial
Proposal regarded EC unfair competition law as insufficient to produce adequate
incentives to invest in database production).
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Thus, while the mosaic of these three legal regimes offers
some protection to database makers from the malcompetitive or parasitic behavior of competitors, users, and information Samaritans, existing legal regimes, both singularly and
collectively, leave database makers exposed to free riders
who can market a competing product at a fraction of the database maker’s cost,100 and to parasitic users and information
Samaritans who can wreak similar havoc to the database
maker’s investments.101 As a result, many commentators
have recognized the need for additional protection to increase incentives to produce databases, those valuable business tools that place information at the fingertips of the
world,102 without extinguishing competition, the ultimate
guardian of consumers in market economies.103
In response to this perceived need to vindicate the competitive ethos in database markets, the EC adopted the Data100. A database maker’s production costs can be expressed as P = dC + dP +
dM + dR, where (P) equals the sum of data collection, purchase, generation, and
validation costs (dC); plus data compiling and presentation costs (dP); plus database marketing, distribution, billing and collection costs (dM); plus database
reproduction costs (dR). See Perritt, supra note 4, at 277 (expressing the costs of
an intellectual property originator). A database pirate’s production costs can be
expressed as p = dA + dT + dM + dR + dL; where (p) equals the sum of data acquisition costs in copying from the database maker (dA); plus data transformation costs (dT); plus database marketing, distribution, billing and collection costs
(dM); plus database reproduction costs (dR); plus legal liability costs (dL). Id.
(expressing the costs of an intellectual property pirate). Assuming database
marketing (dM) and reproduction (dR) costs are equal for the maker and the pirate, the pirate cannot compete in the same market with the database maker on a
price basis unless P > p, or dC + dP > dA + dT + dL. See id. However, as discussed above, head-to-head competition is not the only way a pirate can damage
the maker’s investment. See supra note 73.
101. Id.; see also supra notes 45, 73 and accompanying text (discussing susceptibility of databases to information Samaritans).
102. See supra note 38 and accompanying text; see generally Wendy J.
Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 222-26 (1992) (describing a new tort of “malcompetitive
copying” when defendants knowingly copy protected intangibles in markets exhibiting asymmetrical market failure that damage the creator’s market interests
without providing an equal value to the creator in the long run).
103. See supra note 28.
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base Directive,104 which prompted the United States and the
World Intellectual Property Organization to advance similar
proposals.105
II. COMPARISON OF THE DATABASE DIRECTIVE WITH THE
PROPOSALS
This part compares the U.S. and WIPO Proposals with
the Database Directive (collectively referred to as “regimes”).
While the WIPO Proposal generally tracks the Database Directive, the U.S. Proposal, H.R. 3531, differs in several significant respects. The first apparent difference lies in the
broader definition of “database” found in H.R. 3531.106
A. Scope of Protection
To understand the potential scope of protection afforded
by the regimes, this section first compares the regimes’ definition of “database” and the operative terms which define
and circumscribe the sui generis rights provided to database
makers.107 This section then compares the protection afforded by the regimes to existing databases, and each regime’s affect on existing rights and obligations.
1. Database Defined
The Database Directive and the WIPO Proposal define
“database” as a collection of independent works, data or other
materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way capable of being individually accessed by any means.108 In contrast, H.R. 3531 defines “database” as “a collection, assembly
or compilation, in any form . . . of works, data or other mate104. See Database Directive, supra note 1, recital 1, O.J. L 77/20, at 20 (1996)
(databases are not sufficiently protected in Member States).
105. See supra notes 1, 14-20 and accompanying text.
106. See H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 2.
107. See supra notes 13, 56.
108. See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 1(2), O.J. L 77/20, at 24 (1996);
WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 2(1) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996).
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rial, arranged in a systematic or methodical way.”109
H.R. 3531’s failure to require works to be independent
could sweep recordings of audiovisual, cinematographic, literary, or musical works under its protective cloak; works
that the Database Directive and the WIPO Proposal expressly disclaim.110 Thus, initially, H.R. 3531 appears to define “database” more broadly than either the Database Directive or the WIPO Proposal.
However, H.R. 3531, like the Database Directive and the
WIPO Proposal, extends its initial cloak of protection only to
databases that are the product of a quantitative or qualitative
substantial investment of financial or other resources in the
“collection, assembly, verification, organization or presentation” of the contents of a database.111 Therefore, although
H.R. 3531 may initially define “database” more broadly than
the Database Directive or the WIPO Proposal, the substantial
investment requirement, assuming it is interpreted similarly
under each regime,112 reduces the potential definitional difference.113
109. See H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 2.
110. See Database Directive, supra note 1, recital 17, O.J. L 77/20, at 21
(1996); WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, Note 2.03 WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30,
1996).
111. See H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 3(a); WIPO Proposal, supra note 1,
art. 2(4) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996); cf. Database Directive, supra
note 1, art. 7(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 25 (1996) (substantial investment in the obtaining, verification or presentation of database contents).
112. With the exception of the disclaimer regarding audiovisual works
noted above, neither the Database Directive nor the Proposals define “substantial
investment.” H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 3(a); WIPO Proposal, supra note 1,
art. 2(4) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996); cf. Database Directive, supra
note 1, art. 7(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 25 (1996).
113. But see Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 98-99 (arguing that the
definition in H.R. 3531 is so broad that it might cover noncopyrightable components of computer programs and scientific or historical theories based on fact or
data). However, H.R. 3531 flatly excludes computer programs from the scope of
its protection. See H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 3(d) (“computer programs
are not subject to this Act, including without limitation any computer programs
used in the manufacture, production, operation or maintenance of a database”).
Moreover, the argument that H.R. 3531 defines “database” broadly enough to
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2. Sui Generis Rights Granted
Assuming the database passes the substantial investment
threshold, the database maker114 gains two complementary
rights: (1) the right to prohibit extraction of, and (2) the right
to prohibit reutilization of (the Database Directive), or utilization of (the WIPO Proposal), or use or reuse of (H.R. 3531),
all or a substantial part of the database contents.115 Thus, to
understand the breadth of the complementary rights, one
must examine the definitions of “extraction,” “reutilization,”
“utilization,”116 or “use” and “reuse,” as the case may be, and
“substantial part.”117
cover scientific or historical theories based on significant compilations of facts or
data would apply equally to the Database Directive and the WIPO Proposal.
With today’s digital technology, even three dimensional objects with appropriate
sensing devices can be reduced to a series of ones and zeros that can be compiled
and collected in a database that would find protection under each regime, provided the database meets the benchmark of protection—substantial investment.
Although segments of scientific and historical theory, along with anything else
(except computer programs) that can be reduced to a series of ones and zeros,
can be compiled in database form and protected under either regime, the regimes require the second comer only to obtain those ones and zeros from other
sources, or from the database maker by fair and honest means, for example, by
purchasing a license.
114. See supra note 56.
115. The maker or rightholder is afforded two powers characteristically associated with the bundle of rights deemed property: the power to exclude and
the power to transfer. See generally Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in SelfExpression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property,
102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1546 (1993); Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(2), O.J. L
77/20, at 26 (1996); WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 2(2), (4) WIPO Doc.
CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996) (defining “extraction” and “utilization”), art. 3(1)
(granting the right to prohibit extraction or utilization); H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra
note 1, § 4. The regimes do not create de jure property rights in data. See infra
notes 211-13.
116. Because the meaning of “utilization” as used in the WIPO Proposal is
substantially the same as the terms “use” and “reuse” as used in U.S. Proposal,
see infra note 122, for the reader’s and writer’s benefit, the term “utilization” is
not referred to in the text hereinafter.
117. The “depth” of the complementary rights (i.e., the liability of downstream “innocent users” who may unknowingly reuse database contents made
available by an initial infringer) is not addressed by either regime. However,
knowledge is required to impose criminal liability under H.R. 3531. See H.R.
REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, §§ 8, 13.
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a. The Extraction Right
The Database Directive and the Proposals define “extraction” as “the permanent or temporary transfer of all or a substantial part of the contents of a database” to another medium by any means or in any form.118 Although H.R. 3531
explicitly extends the extraction right to copies of a database,119 the extraction right provided by the Database Directive and the WIPO Proposal would also protect copies.120
Thus, the regimes define the extraction right substantively
the same.
b. The Complementary Reutilization, or Use and
Reuse, Right
The Database Directive and the Proposals define the
complementary reutilization or use right differently in several respects. First, the Database Directive grants a right to
prohibit only reutilization,121 while the Proposals grant a
right to prohibit use and reuse.122 Second, “reutilization” as
defined by the Database Directive123 requires a positive act—
118. See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(a), O.J. L 77/20, at 26
(1996); WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 2(2) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30,
1996); H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 2.
119. See H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 2.
120. A copy necessarily requires transfer of the entire contents of a database,
an act prohibited by each regime. See supra note 115.
121. The Database Directive defines “reutilization” as “any form of making
available to the public all or a substantial part of the contents of a database by
the distribution of copies, by renting, by online, or other forms of transmission.”
See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(b), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996).
122. See supra note 116. The WIPO Proposal defines “utilization” as:
[T]he making available to the public of all or a substantial part of the
contents of a database by any means, including by the distribution of
copies, by renting, or by online, or other forms of transmission, including making the same available to the public at a place and at a time individually chosen by each member of the public.
WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 2(6) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996).
H.R. 3531 defines “use” and “reuse” as “making available all or a substantial
part . . . of the contents of a database, or [providing] access [there]to.” See H.R.
REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 2.
123. See Database Directive, supra note 1, arts. 7(1), 7(2)(b), O.J. L 77/20, at
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transmission—while “use” as defined by the Proposals could
theoretically occur without a positive act.124 Thus, based
solely on the definition of this complementary right, the
Proposals grant the database maker a broader right.
c. Breadth of the Sui Generis Rights
As noted above,125 the breadth of the right to prevent extraction and the right to prevent reutilization, or use and reuse, is linked to the meaning of “substantial part.”126 Here,
the WIPO Proposal diverges slightly, and H.R. 3531 diverges
significantly, from the Database Directive.
The WIPO Proposal defines “substantial part” as “any
portion of the database, including an accumulation of small
portions, that is of qualitative or quantitative significance to
the value of a database.”127 The WIPO Proposal therefore
provides more guidance to courts charged with interpreting
it than does the Database Directive, which purposely left the
definition of “substantial part” to the European Court of Justice.128 However, because the Database Directive specifically
prohibits repeated and systematic extraction or reutilization
of insubstantial parts of the contents of a database which
conflict with the normal exploitation of the database or
25, 26 (1996); supra note 120.
124. See WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, arts. 2(6), 3(1) WIPO Doc.
CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996) (prohibiting use by making available to the public
at a time and place individually chosen by a member of the public); see also H.R.
REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, §§ 2, 4(a)(1) (prohibiting use or reuse by providing
access).
125. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text (the rights to prevent extraction and reutilization, or use and reuse, extends only to all or a substantial
part of the database).
126. See infra notes 127-30 (explaining the regimes’ differing definitions of
substantial part).
127. WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 2(5) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug.
30, 1996).
128. See Jens-L. Gaster, The New EU Directive Concerning the Legal Protection
of Data Bases, in 3 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW &
POLICY, supra note 11, at 4 (explaining that the Commission deliberately left the
task of defining “substantial part” to the European Court of Justice).
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which unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
database maker,129 a court could easily ascribe the same
meaning to the term, whether interpreting the term as found
in the WIPO Proposal or the Database Directive.
H.R. 3531, in contrast, implicitly defines “substantial
part” by defining “insubstantial part” as “any portion of the
contents of a database whose extraction, use or reuse does
not diminish the value of the database, conflict with a normal exploitation of the database or adversely affect the actual or potential market, for the database.”130 Although one
could argue that the legitimate interests of the database
maker could include the potential market, the Database Directive prohibits only acts which “unreasonably prejudice”
those legitimate interests,131 while H.R. 3531 broadly prohibits extractions, uses, and reuses that merely “adversely affect” the actual or potential market.132 H.R. 3531 illustrates
its protective sweep by providing examples of extractions,
uses, and reuses of database contents that would constitute
infringement.133
Some commentators have suggested that the foregoing
provisions of H.R. 3531, coupled with its severe criminal
penalties,134 have the “potential for impeding virtually any
129. See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(5), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996).
130. H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 2 (emphasis supplied).
131. See Database Directive, supra note 1, arts. 7(5), 8(2), O.J. L 77/20, at 26
(1996).
132. H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, §§ 2 (defining “insubstantial part”),
4(a) (prohibited acts).
133. Infringing acts include extraction, use, or reuse of all or a substantial
part of the database contents: (1) in a product or service directly or indirectly
competing with a database from which it was extracted; (2) in a product or service directly or indirectly competing in any market in which the database owner
has a demonstrable interest or expectation in licensing or otherwise; (3) in a
product or service for customers who might otherwise reasonably be expected to
be customers for the database; or (4) in an organization, by or for multiple persons within the organization, in lieu of an additional authorized use or reuse.
H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 4(b).
134. H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 8 (providing for a fine of $250,000 or
imprisonment for five years, or both, for first-time offenders who willfully, and
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judge made [‘fair use’] exceptions”135 and, more importantly,
may cast a shadow on the availability of any pro-competitive
“Magill-like”136 exceptions to the database maker’s “unbounded derivative work right.”137 Nevertheless, despite
H.R. 3531’s potential breadth, it is narrower than the Database Directive and the WIPO Proposal in two significant
ways.138
First, H.R. 3531 expressly withholds protection for databases made by governmental entities, and by governmental

for commercial advantage or who cause $10,000 damage to the database owner
in one calendar year, violate the database owners sui generis rights). The U.S.
Proposal also provides a detailed set of civil remedies for violating the database
makers’ extraction and reutilization rights. See H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1,
§ 12 (providing injunctive relief, impoundment, actual damages or statutory
damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees in certain cases, and treble damages against
persons adjudged a violator of §§ 10 or 11 within the previous three years). In
contrast, violating the database makers’ extraction and reutilization rights under
the Directive triggers “appropriate remedies.” See Database Directive, supra note
1, art. 12, O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996). Under the WIPO Proposal, Contracting Parties must provide “expeditious remedies to prevent infringements, and remedies
that constitute a deterrent to further infringement.” WIPO Proposal, supra note 1,
art. 13 (Alternative B) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996); see also id. (Alternative A incorporating the Annex).
135. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 99.
136. Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, Case 69/89, [1991] E.C.R. 485, 4
C.M.L.R. 586 (Ct. First Instance); British Broadcasting Corp. v. Commission, Case
70/89, [1991] E.C.R. 535, 4 C.M.L.R. 669 (Ct. First Instance); Independent Television Publications Ltd. v. Commission, Case 76/89, [1991] E.C.R. 575, 4 C.M.L.R.
775 (Ct. First Instance) (known collectively as “Magill”) (affirming a compulsory
licensing order against a copyright holder who used the copyright to prevent a
competitor from producing a value-added product (a television program guide);
see also infra notes 276-92 and accompanying text (discussing other swords available in the EC).
137. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 101.
138. In addition, to the extent that the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1,
§ 8, cl.(3), retains any vitality, it places a jurisdictional limit on Congress’s ability
to regulate databases. Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 as beyond Congress’s ability to regulate
under the Commerce Clause). Of course, any limit inherent in the Commerce
Clause would not affect a properly executed treaty. Cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252
U.S. 416 (1920) (unless forbidden by the United States Constitution, the federal
government can act in matters where a national interest exists that can only be
protected by acting in concert with another nation).
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agents in their official capacities.139 Second, H.R. 3531 insulates information users from liability for the “use or reuse of
database contents lawfully extracted from a database[] prior
to the effective date of th[e] Act.”140
3. Rights and Obligations in Existing Databases
The Proposals diverge from the Database Directive in
that the Proposals would sweep all existing databases under
their cloaks of protection,141 while the Database Directive requires protection of only those databases made after January
1, 1983.142 The regimes converge in two respects. First, each
regime provides that the sui generis rights are without prejudice to other rights or obligations in a database or its contents.143 Second, neither regime extends copyright-like protection to the contents of the database. Instead, each regime
requires users or potential competitors either to collect the
information independently, or to pay the database maker for
the collected information.144 In essence, the regimes imbue

139. H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 2. However, H.R. 3531 does not exclude databases merely because its contents have been obtained from a governmental entity. Id. § 3(c). To accommodate this derogation, the WIPO Proposal
makes the matter of protection granted to databases made by governmental entity or their agents a matter for national legislation. WIPO Proposal, supra note 1,
art. 5(2) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996).
140. H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 15 (providing that H.R. 3531 would
become effective upon enactment). In contrast, the WIPO Proposal permits
adoption of a limited two-year window, during which time copies lawfully made
of databases before the effective date of the treaty may be distributed to the public, see WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 11(2), while the Database Directive provides only that its sui generis regime “shall be without prejudice to any acts concluded and rights acquired” before the effective date. Database Directive, supra
note 1, art. 14(4), O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996).
141. WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 11(1) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug.
30, 1996); H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 15.
142. See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 14(3), O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996).
143. Id. art. 13, O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996); H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, §
9; WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 12 WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996).
144. Database Directive, supra note 1, recital 45, O.J. L 77/20, at 23 (1996);
WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, Note 3.02 WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996);
H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 5(b).

730

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[7:697

databases with a portable toll fence.145
B. Beneficiaries of Protection
The Database Directive protects databases made by146 nationals and habitual residents of Member States;147 by companies and firms formed according to the law of a Member
State and having their central administration or principal
place of business within the EC;148 and by companies and
firms having their registered office within the EC, provided
the company or firm has a genuine economic link to a Member State.149 The Database Directive also protects databases
manufactured in third countries by agreement of the Council
of the European Union (“Council”).150
Similarly, the WIPO Proposal protects databases made by
nationals and habitual residents of Contracting Parties;151 by
companies, firms, and other legal entities having their central administration or principal place of business within a

145. See Gordon, supra note 7, at 855.
146. “Databases made by” means “database maker” as that term is defined
by the regimes. See supra notes 13, 56.
147. Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 11(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996).
148. Id. art. 11(2), O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996).
149. Id.
150. Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 11(3), O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996).
Unless eligible under one of the first three options, or unless the United States
enacts a statutory scheme offering comparable protection, American database
makers could not avail themselves of the sui generis regime because the final option requires third countries to provide comparable protection (material reciprocity) to EC databases, Database Directive, supra note 1, recital 56, O.J. L 77/20, at
24 (1996), and because Feist prohibits United States copyright law from extending
comparable protection. See supra note 12 (discussing the Feist decision). Although the material reciprocity requirement seemingly contravenes the most basic principle of the TRIPS agreement—national treatment—the Database Directive falls outside the TRIPS agreement. See Council Common Position No. 95/20,
Statement of the Council’s Reasons 19, O.J. C 288/02, at 28 (1995) [hereinafter
Common Position] (sui generis right not linked to any existing international convention); Reichman, supra note 8, at 347-51.
151. See WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, arts. 6, 7(4) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6
(Aug. 30, 1996).
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Contracting Party;152 and by companies, firms and other legal entities having their registered office in the territory of a
Contracting Party, provided its operations have a genuine
and ongoing economic link to a Contracting Party.153 H.R.
3531, in contrast, protects databases made by natural and juristic persons,154 but, as noted above,155 specifically excludes
governmental entities and certain governmental agents in
their official capacities.156
C. Term of Protection
Rather than providing a single initial term of protection,
the regimes provide a two-stage initial term of protection.157
The Database Directive and the WIPO Proposal, alternative
B,158 provide a fifteen-year term of protection, plus an additional fifteen years if the database is made available to the
public before expiration of the initial term.159 In contrast,
152. See id. art. 6(2), WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996).
153. Id. Note, however, that unlike the Database Directive, which adopts a
material reciprocity standard, see supra note 150, the WIPO Proposal adopts the
standard of national treatment by requiring Contracting Parties to grant database
makers who are nationals of other Contracting Parties the rights granted by the
Treaty and other rights granted to the nationals of the Contracting Party. See
WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 7(1) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996).
154. See H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 2 (defining “juristic person” to
exclude governmental entities).
155. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
156. H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 2.
157. See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 10(1)-(2), O.J. L 77/20, at 26
(1996); WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 8(1)-(2) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug.
30, 1996); H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 6(a).
158. See WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 8(1)-(2) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6
(Aug. 30, 1996) (alternative A provides a 25-year term, while alternative B provides a 15-year term).
159. The initial and second terms begin on January 1 of the year following
the date on which the database meets the requirements for protection, or is made
available to the public. See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 10(1)-(2), O.J. L
77/20, at 26 (1996); WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 8(1)-(2) WIPO Doc.
CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996). The Initial Proposal limited the term of protection
to 10 years. See Initial Proposal, supra note 11, art. 9(3), O.J. C 156/03, at 9 (1992).
Apparently, the term of protection was increased to 15 years as a result of industry lobbying. See Suzanne Perry, Longer Protection in Database Directive Proposed,
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H.R. 3531 provides a potentially perpetual initial term of
protection,160 plus an additional twenty-five years from the
earlier of the date the database is made available to the public or is first placed in commercial use.161
In addition to the initial two-stage term of protection, the
regimes provide the database maker an opportunity to extend the toll fence perpetually.162 However, the Database
Directive and the WIPO Proposal require the same showing
to extend the fence as is required to erect the toll fence: a
substantial investment.163 In contrast, H.R. 3531 requires
only a “change of commercial significance” to extend the
fence perpetually.164
D. Exceptions: User Protections
The regimes protect legitimate users by providing exceptions to, and placing limitations on, the sui generis rights. For
example, each regime avoids conferring a de jure monopoly

REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REP., Mar. 17, 1993, available in Westlaw, Allnewsplus
File.
160. Compare H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 6(a) (term of protection is
triggered by placing in commercial use or making available to the public) with id.
§ 3(b) (databases qualifying for protection under the act remain protected regardless of whether they are made available to the public or placed in commercial
use).
161. See id. § 6(a) (providing that databases remain subject to the act for 25
years after January 1 of the year following the earlier of the date on which the
database is made available to the public or placed in commercial use).
162. See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 10(3), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996);
WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 8(3) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996);
H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 6(b).
163. One can argue that the Database Directive and the WIPO Proposal do
not offer “renewal” options, but rather offer protection only for “new” databases
because the same investment is required to extend protection as to obtain initial
protection. See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 10, O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996);
WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, arts. 8(3), 10 WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30,
1996).
164. See H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, §§ 6(b), 2 (defining “change of
commercial significance” as “a change that a reasonable user of a database would
regard as affecting the quality, quantity or value” of the database contents as a
whole).
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on facts or information,165 and provides that all other laws
regarding databases or their contents—chief among them for
purposes of this Article, competition law and laws in respect
to access to public documents—shall remain unaffected by
the respective regime.166
Additionally, the Database Directive and the WIPO Proposal expressly permit Member States and Contracting Parties, respectively, to enact limited “fair-use” exceptions.167
H.R. 3531 does not expressly provide fair-use exceptions, but
does follow the Database Directive in permitting lawful database users to extract, use, and reuse insubstantial amounts
of data for “any purposes whatsoever.”168 The Database Directive strengthens this user protection by deeming contractual provisions to the contrary void,169 but qualifies the protection by prohibiting users from performing acts that either
conflict with normal exploitation of the database or unreasonably prejudice the database maker’s legitimate interests.170
In contrast, H.R. 3531 permits parties to contract

165. However, in the case of sole-source data, the regimes could result in a
de facto monopoly on facts. See infra notes 262-70 and accompanying text.
166. Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 13, O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996); H.R.
REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 9(c); WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 12 WIPO Doc.
CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996).
167. See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 9, O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996);
WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 5(1) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996).
In this respect, the WIPO Proposal would permit broader “fair-use” exceptions
than the Database Directive. Compare WIPO Proposal, art. 5(1) WIPO Doc.
CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996) (permitting exceptions to and limitations on the
extraction and use rights in special cases that do not conflict with the normal exploitation of the database and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the database right-holder) with Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 9,
O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996) (providing three specific enumerated exceptions which
may be authorized by Member States). The Database Directive’s exceptions are
discussed more fully infra notes 294-321 and accompanying text.
168. H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 5(a); Database Directive, supra note 1,
art. 8(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996).
169. Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 15, O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996).
170. Id. art. 8(1)-(2), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996).
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around this potential user protection.171 H.R. 3531 also severely limits “any purposes whatsoever”172 by prohibiting
users from performing or procuring acts that singularly or
cumulatively, adversely affect the actual or potential market
for the database.173 Considering this limitation and others
noted above,174 “one is hard pressed to imagine”175 a legitimate purpose for which a user could extract or use even an
insubstantial amount of data from a database protected by
H.R. 3531 without the database maker’s authorization.
E. The Proposals’ Provisions Regarding Protection-Defeating
Devices and Database Management Information
The Proposals prohibit the importation, manufacture, or
distribution of devices whose primary purpose or effect is to
defeat or circumvent self-protection measures176 taken by
database makers to prevent unauthorized extractions and
utilizations.177 Violation of this prohibition triggers “appropriate and effective remedies”178 under the WIPO Proposal,
and triggers a detailed set of civil remedies under H.R.
3531.179
In addition, H.R. 3531 offers protection to database makers who mark their products with database management in171. See H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 9(b) (permitting parties to freely
contract with regard to databases and their contents).
172. See supra note 168.
173. H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 4; see also supra notes 108-45 and accompanying notes (d
174. See supra notes 108-45 and accompanying notes (
175. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 100.
176. Such self-protection measures might include encryption or passwordprotection systems.
177. WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 10 WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30,
1996); H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 10. The Database Directive does not
address protection-defeating devices.
178. WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 10(2) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug.
30, 1996).
179. These are the same remedies triggered for violation of the extraction
and use rights. See supra note 134.
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formation.180 Knowingly providing false database management information, or knowingly altering or removing database management information without authority of the database maker, triggers both civil remedies and severe
criminal penalties.181
III. MAKING THE PARADIGMATIC SHIFT: LINKING
INCENTIVES TO PRODUCTION COSTS
To explain the implications of the Database Directive’s
sui generis regime, this part182 analyzes the Database Directive in light of applicable EC law, using the factual background of a recent United States case, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg.183 This part also examines the balance the Database
Directive strikes in the EC between the public’s need for information access and the database maker’s need for production incentives. Finally, this part responds to criticisms and
concerns voiced by commentators.184
Seeking to correct the imbalance of investment between
the EC and the world, and between EC members in database
production,185 the Database Directive seeks to harmonize existing European copyright law186 while simultaneously erecting a renewable, potentially perpetual, fifteen-year toll

180. H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 11.
181. Id. §§ 11, 13 (violation of § 11 with intent to defraud can be punished by
fine of up to $500,000 or five years’ imprisonment, or both). Neither the Database Directive nor the WIPO Proposal explicitly address database management
information.
182. Unless stated otherwise, this part addresses only the Database Directive, not the Proposals. So the reader will not have to refer back to Part II and
wrest information, applicable only to the Database Directive, from the Proposals,
some information previously discussed is repeated in this part.
183. 908 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis. 1996), rev’d, 86 F. 3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
184. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 11; see also Hugh C. Hansen, International Copyright: An
Unorthodox Analysis, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 579, 581 (1996) (explaining that
one purpose of the Directives is to improve European competitiveness).
186. But see supra note 5 (explaining that the Directive permits derogation
for less exacting regimes).
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fence187 that prohibits unauthorized extraction and reutilization188 of the whole or a substantial part189 of electronic and
nonelectronic databases.190 Available191 to database makers
187. The sui generis regime creates a fence, rather than a wall, because the
regime permits some leakage (e.g., it permits insubstantial extractions and permits Member States to enact ‘quasi-fair use’ exceptions). Database Directive, supra note 1, arts. 7-9, O.J. L 77/20, at 25-26 (1996). Theoretically, the 15-year fence
can be extended perpetually; however, entitlement to another 15-year fence requires the same showing required for initial protection: a substantial new investment. Id. art. 10(3), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996). As noted above in Part II, the
initial term of protection under the Database Directive could approximate 30
years if the database maker withholds the database for almost 15 years before
initial release to the public.
188. Extraction is “the permanent or temporary transfer of all or a substantial part of the contents of a database to another medium by any means or in any
form.” Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(a), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996).
Reutilization is “any form of making available to the public all or a substantial
part of the contents of a database by the distribution of copies, by renting, by online or other forms of transmission.” Id. art. 7(2)(b), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996).
189. “Substantial part” may be evaluated quantitatively or qualitatively.
Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 25 (1996). Though neither measure is defined by the directive, a lawful user “may not perform acts
which conflict with normal exploitation of the database or unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests” of the database maker. Id. art. 8(2), O.J. L 77/20, at
26 (1996); see also Gaster, supra note 128, at (explaining that the Commission deliberately left the task of defining “substantial part” to the European Court of Justice); Rosler, supra note 11, at 120 (noting that many industry associations lobbied
for actual percentage levels to determine infringement).
190. Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 1(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 24 (1996). The
Initial Proposal, supra note 11, and the Amended Proposal, supra note 24, covered
only electronic databases. The Council extended the scope of the Database Directive to nonelectronic databases because it obviated the need to draw a distinction between electronic and nonelectronic databases; because the Council
deemed it inappropriate for a database distributed in both electronic and
nonelectronic forms to receive different levels of protection; and because no such
distinction is drawn in other international agreements. See Common Position,
supra note 150, Statement of the Council’s Reasons 8, O.J. C 288/02, at 24 (1995).
Another need for the extension, although not noted in the Database Directive, is
that today’s high speed scanners and optical character recognition software
make electronic conversion of nonelectronic databases almost as easy as electronic conversion of electronic databases. See Samuelson, supra note 11, at 3-4.
191. EC Member States must bring into force laws, regulations, and administrative provisions necessary to comply with the Database Directive before
January 1, 1998. Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 16(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 27
(1996). In addition, Norway, Iceland, Poland, and Turkey must implement the
Database Directive in accordance with their bilateral agreements. See Powell,
supra note 11, at 1.
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in Member States192 who can show a substantial investment193 in obtaining, verifying, or presenting the underlying
data,194 the toll fence protects the commercial interests of database makers while attempting to accommodate the public’s interests.
The Database Directive accommodates the public’s interests by allowing insubstantial extractions from, and reuse of,
the contents of databases made publicly available;195 by
deeming public lending not an act of extraction or reutilization;196 by permitting Member States to enact “fair use” exceptions;197 and by extinguishing the database maker’s right
to control resale after the first sale.198 Additionally, although
the Database Directive does not mandate compulsory li-

192. See supra note 191.
193. Substantial investment in data collection can be measured qualitatively
or quantitatively. Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 25
(1996). Although the Database Directive indicates that compilation of several
recordings of musical performances on a compact disc is not a substantial
enough investment to be eligible for sui generis protection, id. recital 19, O.J. L
77/20, at 21 (1996), it fails to indicate the minimum level of investment required
for such protection.
194. Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 25 (1996), recital 40, O.J. L 77/20, at 22 (1996). Obtaining/verifying data are self-explanatory
concepts that apply equally to both electronic and nonelectronic databases. Presenting data is similarly self-explanatory in the context of nonelectronic databases; however, the concept of “presentation” in the context of electronic databases is generally inapplicable because users usually determine how such data is
presented. See Ginsburg, supra note 6; Denicola, supra note 12, at 531. Obtaining,
verifying, and presenting data will be collectively referred to hereinafter as “data
collection.”
195. Unless repeated and systematic insubstantial extractions unreasonably
prejudice the database maker’s legitimate interests. Database Directive, supra
note 1, art. 8, O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996); see also id. art. 15, O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996)
(making contracts to the contrary void).
196. Id. art. 7(2)(b), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996).
197. See id. art. 9, O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996) (giving Member States the option
to provide lawful users of publicly-available databases the right to privately reproduce nonelectronic databases; the right to use for noncommercial teaching/scientific uses; and the right to use for governmental security, administrative, or judicial purposes).
198. Id. art. 7(2)(b), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996).
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censes,199 Member States can theoretically compel them
when in the public’s interest,200 and, realistically, European
courts seem ready to vindicate the public’s interest in competition when information producers abuse their dominant
position.201 Finally, the Database Directive contemplates the
199. Previous proposals mandated compulsory licenses on “fair and nondiscriminatory terms” in the case of sole-source data. Sole-source data are data that
cannot be “independently created, collected or obtained from any other source.”
See Initial Proposal, supra note 11, art. 8, O.J. C 156/03, at 9 (1992); Amended
Proposal, supra note 24, art. 11, O.J. C 308/01, at 13-14 (1993).
200. Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 13, O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996) (“This
directive shall be without prejudice to . . . laws on restrictive practices and unfair
competition . . . .”).
201. See, e.g., Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, Case 69/89, [1991] E.C.R.
485, 4 C.M.L.R. 586 (Ct. First Instance); British Broadcasting Corp. v. Commission, Case 70/89, [1991] E.C.R. 535, 4 C.M.L.R. 669 (Ct. First Instance); Independent Television Publications Ltd. v. Commission, Case 76/89, [1991] E.C.R. 575, 4
C.M.L.R. 775 (Ct. First Instance). In Magill, Magill TV Guide Ltd. (“Magill”) attempted to publish a comprehensive television program guide based upon
weekly listings published in separate program guides by British and Irish broadcasters (no comprehensive listing was available to viewers in Ireland). Joined
Cases, 241/91 & 242/91, [1995] E.C.R. 743, 812, ¶ 10. Availing themselves of the
copyright protection afforded listings in Ireland and Great Britain, the broadcasters sought and obtained an injunction against Magill, who had already
lodged a complaint with the European Commission. Id. at 812, ¶¶ 10-11. The
Commission found that the broadcasters had abused a dominant position and
ordered the broadcasters to supply their weekly listings to parties requesting
them for a reasonable rate, effectively forcing a compulsory license. Id. at 812-13,
¶¶ 12-13. The European Court of Justice upheld the compulsory licensing order,
finding that there was consumer demand for the comprehensive guide for which
there was no available substitute, and held that the broadcasters’ refusal to supply the data prevented the appearance of a new product and the broadcasters’
had therefore abused a dominant position in violation of Article 86 of the Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II) [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. Radio Telefis
Eireann, [1995] E.C.R. at 824, ¶¶ 53-54. Although Article 86 is triggered only
when abuse of a dominant position has the potential to affect trade between
Member States, David Harbord, Barriers to Entry and Exit in European Competition
Policy, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 411, 421 (1994), it is not necessary that the conduct in question have an actual, substantial effect on trade; rather, it is only necessary the conduct is capable of having such an effect. Radio Telefis Eireann, [1995]
E.C.R. at 828, ¶ 69. Moreover, competition policy in the EC is converging. See
generally LEAH DAVISON ET AL., THE EUROPEAN COMPETITIVE MARKET (1995) (explaining that national competition policy is beginning to reflect supranational
competition policy). Furthermore, as markets within the Community become
more European in character, it will be increasingly difficult to prove that a par-
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public’s interest in free competition by mandating a triennial
review of the sui generis regime to determine whether anticompetitive effects require the establishment of a compulsory licensing scheme.202
Yet, despite these seemingly broad protections of the
public interest, many commentators, echoing the monocular
vision of Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service,203 have
expressed serious concerns about the negative effects of the
Database Directive on the “free” flow of information,204
while others have argued that the Database Directive is anticompetitive and will retard long-term growth in the database industry.205 To determine whether these concerns are
ticular activity will have only a purely national effect. Id. Thus, plaintiffs should
find it increasingly easier to use Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty to enjoin
anticompetitive behavior within the European Economic Community (“EEC”);
see generally Corbet, supra, note 29 (analyzing the interaction between EC competition law and intellectual property law).
202. Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 16(3), O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996)
(“[E]very three years . . . the Commission . . . shall examine in particular the application of the sui generis right, . . . especially whether the application of this
right has led to abuse of a dominant position or other interference with free
competition which would justify . . . the establishment of non-voluntary licensing arrangements.”).
203. See supra note 12. Feist’s myopic focus on the inability of facts to be
original (an epistemologically erroneous view, see supra note 37), and almost
singular concern over harming the public by creating a monopoly in public domain materials, “grossly neglect[ed] copyright’s incentive role.” See Ginsburg,
supra note 6, at 350.
204. See Rosler, supra note 11, at 146 (the Database Directive’s most dangerous aspect is “its potential to stifle access to information”); Reichman &
Samuelson, supra note 4, at 108-17, 123-24 (arguing that, by impeding the flow of
information, the Database Directive and Proposals will put basic science and
other public interest groups at risk); Academy Letter, supra note 23, at 1-2 (arguing that the pending WIPO Proposal “would seriously undermine the ability of
researchers and educators to access and use scientific data, and would have a
deleterious long-term impact on our nation’s research capabilities”); GLOBAL
ACCESS, supra note 4, at 35 (summarizing the potential effects of an “overly protective database regime”).
205. See Rosler, supra note 11, at 108 (arguing that the Database Directive
will fail both as an international trade mechanism and as an economic policy); see
also Von Simson, supra note 23, at 766-68 (arguing that because the sui generis regime will reward lower-level economic behavior (data collection), compilers will
have little incentive to invest higher-level creative activity that result in userfriendly features). However, this view ignores the pressure to provide user-
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well-founded, it is useful to apply the Database Directive’s
protections, and other offsetting ameliorative measures
available to members of the EC, to a set of facts.
A. Vindicating the Competitive Ethos in Nonproprietary
Data: Forcing Free Riders to Become Fair Followers
Aimed at increasing European market share in the database market,206 the transferable sui generis rights207 created
by the Database Directive raise a legal barrier to misappropriation208 of database makers’ investment in data collection.209 Assuming a database maker can prove a substantial
enough investment210 to secure protection, the sui generis regime affords the maker two complementary quasi-property
friendly features inherent in the competitive market. See Digital Equip., 73 F.3d at
762 (“[P]igheaded refusal to satisfy customers’ preferences . . . leads to ruin as
rivals step in to take the business.”) In addition, it ignores the fact that higherlevel creative activity will still enjoy copyright protection under the Database Directive. See generally Database Directive, supra note 1, arts. 3-6, O.J. L 77/20, at 25
(1996).
206. See supra note 11. The lagging European market can be explained in
part by fragmented nature of the European market and the economies of scale
achieved in the larger United States market. See Melnik, supra note 2, at 60; see
also Rosler, supra note 11, at 109-10 (noting that the United States retains many
advantages in the database market, including a monolingual market, and
economies of scale built upon years of industry experience and consolidation).
207. The sui generis rights may be transferred, assigned or granted under
contractual license. Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(3), O.J. L 77/20, at 26
(1996).
208. Database Directive, supra note 1, recital 39, O.J. L 77/20, at 22 (1996)
(providing that “this Directive seeks to safeguard the positions of makers of databases against misappropriation” of financial and human capital investment in
obtaining, verifying or presenting data); cf. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (recognizing misappropriation); see generally
Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149 (1992).
209. “Data collection” is defined supra note 194.
210. See Database Directive, supra note 1, recitals 53-54, O.J. L 77/20, at 24
(1996) (burden on maker to prove substantial enough investment to secure protection). Unfortunately, like many key terms of the Database Directive, the substantial investment criterion is ill-defined. See supra note 193. Thus, the burden a
database maker must carry to secure protection under the sui generis regime will
remain uncertain until interpreted by the European courts.
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rights:211 the right to prevent extraction of the contents of
the database and the right to prevent reutilization of the contents of the database.212 Of capital importance in assessing
these rights is understanding, first, their linkage to the contents of the database, and second, that neither extends copyright protection to the underlying facts and data.213
Rather than attempting to assess these rights in a theoretical vacuum, the following assessment is made in light of
the factual background of ProCD v. Zeidenberg,214 a case that
underscores the need for a sui generis regime to protect compilers from the malcompetitive behavior of free riders and
information Samaritans, and provides a set of facts tailormade for exploring the application and outer limits of the
Database Directive’s sui generis regime.
1. The Facts of ProCD v. Zeidenberg
In creating a comprehensive, nationwide electronic
phone directory, the database maker in Zeidenberg spent ap211. See Gordon, supra note 115, at 1546. The sui generis regime does not create de jure property rights in the underlying facts, although in the case of solesource data, which cannot be independently generated or acquired from another
source, it may create de facto property rights in the underlying facts. For this reason and because of the potential exceptions and limits on the sui generis rights,
these rights lie somewhere between the exclusive property right in expression
granted by copyright and the protection afforded noncopyrightable facts by INS.
See INS, 248 U.S. at 236. With regard to nonproprietary data, the sui generis regime functions more like permanent, portable trade secret protection; that is, the
second comer is presented with a two options: obtain a license from the database maker to access its contents or obtain its contents by “proper means.” Cf.
Reichman, supra note 10, at 2438-40.
212. “Extraction” is defined supra at note 188; “reutilization” is defined supra
at notes 121 and 188; see Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(1), O.J. L 77/20,
at 25 (1996).
213. Id. recital 45, O.J. L 77/20, at 23 (1996). As a result, that which is in the
public domain, remains in the public domain. However, this postulation breaks
down in the case of sole-source data. Moreover, the incentive it creates to privatize data raises concerns about the flow of information that must be addressed by
ameliorative measures. These concerns are discussed infra at text accompanying
notes 262-322.
214. See supra note 183.
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proximately $10 million215 compiling more than ninety-five
million residential and commercial listings from approximately 3,000 telephone directories.216 After purchasing the
listings on compact disc for less than $200, the free rider electronically extracted and recompiled twenty million listings
from the maker’s database into his own database, and made
“his” listings freely217 available over the Internet.218 On cross
motions for summary judgment, the district court, while noting the database maker’s argument that the free rider’s conduct was unfair and commercially destructive had “substantial equitable appeal,” rejected the maker’s federal copyright
claim, as well as the maker’s state law claims of breach of
contract, misappropriation, and unfair competition.219 Thus,
the district court’s holding left the free rider, and others like
him, free to purchase the databases of others, to ignore the
shrink-wrap license, to extract electronically the database’s
contents at a fraction of the makers’ effort, and then to sell
that content in a different wrapper for a lower price,220 or to
215. Judge Freezes Student’s Internet Service, B. GLOBE, Sept. 24, 1995, at 41.
216. See Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. at 644.
217. Although the free rider charged for advertising in this case, the Database Directive would prevent all free riders, whether commercially motivated or
not, from engaging in such commercially destructive (incentive-reducing) behavior. See Database Directive, supra note 1, arts. 8-9, O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996).
218. See Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. at 646.
219. See id. at 643. The district court refused to treat the shrink-wrap license
as a licensing agreement. Id. at 650-51. Instead, the court held the agreement
unenforceable under the Uniform Commercial Code for lack of assent (the free
rider was a graduate student who disregarded screen warnings that use of the
product was subject to the license agreement). Id. at 655. Although the district
court’s holding with regard to the federal copyright claim was a logical application of Feist, the court’s rejection of the shrink-wrap license was analytically unsound. G. M. Hunsucker, Raising a Toll Fence to Protect the “Noncreative” Labors of Database Makers: The European Database Directive 15 n.43 (May 1,
1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Professor J. H. Reichman, Vanderbilt
University School of Law). Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit reversed on appeal.
See supra note 25; see also National Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 1997 WL
34001, at *34010 (2d Cir. 1997) (approving the Seventh Circuit’s analysis of the
state contract law claim).
220. See supra notes 5, 73 and accompanying text; see also Reichman, supra
note 10, at 2452-53.
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provide that content to others free of charge.221
2. Protecting the Database Maker’s Investment from
Free Riders and Information Samaritans
In the illustrative case, the free rider electronically extracted twenty million of the ninety-five million telephone
listings contained in the maker’s database,222 downloaded
them to his hard drive, and then recompiled the listings into
his own database.223 Under the sui generis regime created by
the Database Directive, the free rider’s first act violated the
database maker’s right to prevent extraction because he extracted224 the contents of the database and because that extraction was substantial.225 Similarly, when the free rider
later made “his” database accessible via his Internet web
page, he violated the database maker’s right to prevent reutilization because he made a substantial part of the contents
of the maker’s database publicly available.226

221. See supra note 5.
222. Court Decision Goes Against Pro CD, ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE REP., Jan.
23, 1996, available in Westlaw, Allnewsplus File. To put this into perspective, if
one amortizes the data collection costs to the database maker over the all 95 million listings, the free rider saved over two million dollars in data collection costs;
or, to put it another way, the free rider appropriated over two million dollars of
the maker’s investment in data collection.
223. See Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. at 645-46.
224. The free rider’s first act would have been an extraction whether he
downloaded the data to his hard drive, printer, or any other medium. See supra
note 188 (defining “extraction”). Moreover, even if the free rider had accomplished the transfer by manually keying the data in, and had thus expended
considerably more effort, it would still constitute an unauthorized extraction under the Database Directive. See supra note 188.
225. Like many of the operative terms in the Database Directive, what precisely constitutes a “substantial part” of the contents of the database is not defined. Apparently, the Commission intended to leave the definitional task to the
European courts. See Gaster, supra note 128, at . However, it would defy common sense, as well as the policy to protect database makers from the misappropriation of their data collection efforts, to find that the free rider, who extracted
20 million of 95 million telephone listings contained in a maker’s database did
not extract a substantial part of the contents of the database.
226. Id.
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Even if a court found that the free rider did not extract or
reuse a substantial part of the database contents, the database maker could fall back on a second prong of protection—the right to prevent extraction or reutilization of insubstantial parts of the database—when those repeated
insubstantial extractions or reutilizations unreasonably
prejudice the maker’s rights.227 Here, the free rider’s database permitted extraction of 1,000 listings per search, and
prior to the law suit was being accessed via the Internet approximately 20,000 times per day.228
With the explosive growth of Internet access providers,229
information-rich Web pages,230 and user-friendly interfaces
that make “surfing the Net” easy even for neophytes,231 it
seems reasonable to conclude that many users would forego
the $200 price tag of the database maker’s product in favor
of free access to the free rider’s product. Thus, by making
the contents of the database maker’s product freely available
to the public, the free rider’s actions unreasonably prejudiced the maker’s rights and interfered with the maker’s
normal exploitation of the database. As a result, the theoretical EC database maker would be entitled to appropriate
remedies.232
227. Although database makers cannot prevent lawful users from extracting/reutilizing insubstantial parts of the publicly-available databases, Database
Directive, supra note 1, art. 8(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996), lawful users must refrain from performing acts that unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of
the database maker. Id. art. 8(2), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996); see also id. art. 15, O.J.
L 77/20, at 27 (1996) (making contractual provisions contrary to article 8 null and
void).
228. See Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. at 646.
229. Cf. id. (noting that lawsuits concerning ownership of data distributed
via the Internet is natural given the explosive growth of the Internet) (citing Jane
C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the “Information SuperHighway”: Authors, Exploiters,
and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466 (1995)).
230. See Cade Metz, The 100 Top Web Sites, PC MAG., Feb. 6, 1996, at 100.
231. See Rick Ayre & Thomas Mace, Just Browsing, PC MAG., Mar. 12, 1996,
at 100.
232. See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 12, O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996)
(requiring Member States to provide appropriate remedies for infringements of
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Thus, the Database Directive not only protects database
makers from free riders who seek to gain a competitive advantage by extracting the contents of the maker’s database
(and thereby avoid the costs of data collection),233 but also
protects database makers from the market-destructive antics
of information Samaritans.234 In this respect, the Directive
fills two gaps left by existing legal regimes.235
Moreover, long-term production incentives for database
production are more sustainable under the Directive’s sui
generis regime because the existence and degree of protection
are linked to investment,236 rather than the superficial form
of the final product hailed the linchpin of protection by
copyright law.237 Furthermore, by jettisoning the paradoxical linchpins of arrangement and selection238 required for database protection under most copyright regimes,239 the Dithe rights provided by the Database Directive).
233. See supra note 99; see also National Basketball Ass’n, 1997 WL 34001, at
*34013-15 (rejecting the NBA’s claim that Motorola was free-riding by transmitting NBA game statistics almost contemporaneously, because Motorola was not
free riding, but rather independently collecting, assembling, and transmitting the
data). In NBA v. Motorola, however, the Second Circuit hinted that its analysis
might differ if Motorola were collecting the facts (free riding) via a NBA datafeed. Id. at *34013-14.
234. See supra note 5.
235. See supra notes 57-101 and accompanying text.
236. See Denicola, supra note 12, at 530 (sufficient production incentives cannot be maintained without linking the existence and degree of protection to the
total production costs). Although one can doubtless provide examples of databases that would be produced with far less than 15 years of protection provided
by the Database Directive, even copyright and the law of trade secrets produce
questionable results on their margins. Can one justify protecting a copyrighted
work for an additional 74 years after it has netted the creator several million dollars in its first year? Eternal trade secret protection for a consumable item
proven to cause physiological damage, which has no redeeming characteristics?
237. Id.
238. The linchpins are paradoxical because although both requirements
purport to protect the public’s interest in public domain information, they also
work against the public’s interest in promoting knowledge in several ways. See
supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text; see generally Ginsburg, supra note 6, at
344-46; Reichman, supra note 10, at 2491.
239. See Berne Convention, supra note 8, art. 2(5), 828 U.N.T.S. at 221; 17
U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 103; Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499
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rective’s sui generis regime avoids the perverse incentives
that reduce the accessibility and usability of databases240 and
ultimately work against the public’s interest in promoting
knowledge.241
Finally, this act of legal candor242 in recognizing that the
compiler’s primary contribution to the promotion of knowledge is through investment in data collection,243 rather than
data arrangement or selection, leaves courts free to focus on
protecting the commercial interests of the database maker
from parasitic competitors and other misappropriators who
reduce incentives to produce commercially-valuable databases.
3. Protecting the Public’s Interest in Competition
Protecting the database maker’s commercial interests,
however, does not mean that the misappropriation fence
raised by the Database Directive completely insulates the database maker from all competition.244 On the contrary, because the fence prohibits only extraction and/or reutilization
of the contents of databases, and does not extend copyright
protection to mere facts or data,245 the fence merely proscribes one method of data collection;246 it does not empower
database makers to remove data from the public domain.247

U.S. 340, 356 (1991); Database Directive, supra note 1, recitals 15-16, O.J. L 77/20,
at 21, art. 3(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 25 (1996).
240. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text
241. See supra notes 38, 65-71 and accompanying text
242. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 154 (“[T]he European Commission’s frank acknowledgment that the [Database Directive’s sui generis regime]
would protect investment as such amounts to a refreshing act of legal candor.”).
243. See Denicola, supra note 12, at 530.
244. But see Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 90 (arguing that, under
the Database Directive, the database maker obtains protection exceeded only by
the protection afforded patent holders).
245. See Database Directive, supra note 1, recital 45, O.J. L 77/20, at 23 (1996).
246. See Denicola, supra note 12, at 541.
247. See supra note 213.
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It follows necessarily that fair followers248 remain free to
create identical databases, so long as they do not create those
databases by appropriating the contents from a protected
database.249 Thus, under the Database Directive, the freerider-turned-fair-follower can go forth, collect the same data,
and compile and market an identical database or any variant
thereof,250 without infringing the rights provided by the sui
generis regime to the database maker.251
Alternatively, the fair follower can seek a license from the
database maker.252 Although the Database Directive does
not mandate licensing,253 the database maker risks price
competition from more efficient fair followers if the maker
248. See Reichman, supra note 30.
249. This statement assumes the contents of, or the database itself, do not
enjoy copyright protection. Professor Litman’s observation that this result is
functionally indistinguishable from granting copyright protection to the underlying facts, Litman, supra note 37, at 1016 & n.289, holds true in the case of proprietary data, but not in the case of nonproprietary data. To illustrate, assume a
copyright holder in a literary work, by definition expression not existing in the
public domain, proves that a second comer who produced an identical work had
access to the first work. Notwithstanding incantations that independent creation
is a perfect defense in copyright, see, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,
81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936), it seems incredulous to
suggest that the second comer could overcome the presumption of copying and
the inherent skepticism of judges and juries. Now assume a similar situation for
a database of nonproprietary facts protected under the sui generis regime. Here,
the second comer can more easily produce objective evidence demonstrating the
data collection costs incurred in gathering public domain materials. As a practical matter, the second comer would have a lower burden of production under
the sui generis regime.
250. This statement assumes the data are freely accessible and not otherwise
protected. Using the Zeidenberg facts as an example, if the data were protected,
the database maker would be in the same position vis-à-vis the compilers of the
3,000 directories as the free rider was to the maker. The irony of the database
maker’s suing the free rider, after cloaking himself with the constitutional protection afforded free riders by Feist (the database maker copied unprotected data
from 3,000 directories) was perhaps a, if not the, critical factor in the district
court’s decision to deny relief. See Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. at 658 (it is ironic that
after obtaining the benefits of copyright, the plaintiff seeks to prevent others
from obtaining those same benefits).
251. See supra notes 13, 56.
252. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
253. See infra note 273.
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tries to extract too high a price for the license.254
Similarly, because data are fungible, the database maker
who overprices his product also risks price competition from
more efficient fair followers who independently create identical databases.255 Consequently, competitive pressures in
the nonproprietary database market should provide the database maker with an incentive to achieve greater efficiency
in data collection: the more efficient the maker is in collecting the data, the harder it will be for fair followers to compete on a price basis.256
Thus, unlike other intellectual property regimes, such as
copyright and patent, which use a winner-take-all approach
to overcome risk aversion,257 the sui generis regime, at least
with respect to nonproprietary data, serves the same “procompetitive functions as does the law of trade secrets”258
without requiring actual secrecy.259 Therefore, with respect
to nonproprietary data,260 the combination of marketimposed price limits and market inducements to achieve
maximum efficiency in data collection should redound to the
benefit of the information-using public in the form of more

254. Cf. National Basketball Ass’n, 1997 WL 34001, at *34014 (explaining that
the data collector producing the cheaper or otherwise superior product will prevail in the marketplace).
255. Id.
256. Other factors affect the fair follower’s ability to compete on a price basis. For example, data which is extremely difficult to collect may give the first
database maker sufficient time to gain significant market share, which in turn
may act as a barrier to entry. See supra note 100. In addition, data accuracy is
also a consideration that may affect an unknown fair follower’s ability to compete because data users may be unwilling to gamble on unknown data compilers
when accuracy is critical. See Roger Elliot, Chairman’s Report (visited May 11,
1997) <http://www.grainger.uiuc.edu/icsu/confchmn.htm> (noting need for
strict peer review of scientific data submitted for publication in electronic journals); cf. Perritt, supra note 4, at
.
257. See Reichman, supra note 4, at 486.
258. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d at 1455 (citing Rockwell Graphic Sys. v. DEV Indus.,
925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991)); cf. Reichman, supra note 10, at 2439-40.
259. See supra note 57.
260. See supra note 24.

1997]

EUROPEAN DATABASE DIRECTIVE

749

comprehensive and less costly databases.261
B. Criticisms of the Database Directive Regarding SoleSource Data: Is the Sky Falling?
June 13, 2013:
Yesterday scientists discovered a method which
stimulates the body’s immune system to a level sufficient to kill the AIDS virus . . . . Unfortunately the scientists have embodied these data within a database,
have set the price of each treatment at one million
dollars, and have refused to license the critical data.
—Chicken Little, The Sky Is Falling, CASSANDRA WEEKLY,
at 13.
Although perhaps a bit extreme, the hyperbole makes the
point: extending the sui generis extraction and reutilization
rights to database makers who are also data sources, or who
are the exclusive licensee of data sources, creates the risk of
data privatization,262 with its attendant risk of monopolistic
pricing, for potentially perpetual fifteen-year renewable periods,263 rather than just legitimately protecting the investments of database makers.264 For that reason and several
others, it initially appears that this Article’s working hypothesis, that the sui generis regime vindicates the competitive ethos, breaks down in the case of sole-source data.265
First, the implicit market limits that flow from the possi-

261. But see supra notes 204-05, infra note 362 (citing commentators who argue that regime will result in data monopolies, which will, in turn, stifle access to
information).
262. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 84-85 (arguing that the Database Directive would eventually abolish public domain data).
263. See supra note 187 (noting that a “renewal” requires a substantial new
investment).
264. Even the Directive’s harshest critics agree that database makers have
legitimate interests in a new form of legal protection. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 55; GLOBAL ACCESS, supra note 4, at 24-25.
265. See supra notes 24, 198 (defining “sole-source data”).
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bility of fair followers being more efficient data collectors are
reduced, and in limited circumstances eliminated, in the case
of sole-source data because the fence created by the sui
generis regime effectively enables the first database maker to
control dissemination of the raw data.266 This power to control the dissemination of sole-source data enables the first
database maker not only to charge monopolistic fees for access to the database, but also to charge monopolistic licensing fees, if the database maker chooses to license at all, to fair
followers seeking to use the sole-source data in a competing
or value-added product.267
Second, the sui generis regime creates an incentive to privatize data that in turn raises legitimate concerns over database makers’ ability to control the dissemination of information.268 Because anyone can make a database, including
those in charge of conducting basic scientific research, this
incentive could spill over into academia and reduce the indirect subsidies now provided to private research and development.269 Although privatizing data might result in more
short-term basic research, privatization of data as such could
stifle innovation by diminishing long-term research and development, particularly if database makers secure exclusive
licenses and effect a cartelization of data sources.270
The initial and amended versions of the Database Directive addressed these potential problems head-on by mandating compulsory licenses on fair and nondiscriminatory terms

266. See supra note 213
267. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 117-19 (sui generis regime
will impede competition in the value-added market).
268. See Rosler, supra note 11, at 141-42. Although the sui generis regimes
raise potential First Amendment issues, see, e.g., Reichman & Samuelson, supra
note 4, at 79, those issues are beyond the scope of this Article.
269. See Reichman, supra note 10, at 2498; see also infra note 356
270. Cf. Reichman, supra note 10, at 2497-98. But see infra notes 373-85 and
accompanying notes (discussing
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in the case of sole-source data.271 However, the Common
Position272 removed the compulsory licensing provision in
favor of other ameliorative measures aimed at protecting the
user.273 The next section examines these ameliorative measures in light of the criticisms regarding sole-source data
noted above,274 to ascertain whether the Database Directive’s
sui generis regime is underprotective, overprotective, or perhaps somewhere between the two extremes.275
C. The Ameliorative Measures: Will They Protect the
Public’s Interest in Competition?
The Database Directive not only provides swords that

271. Initial Proposal, supra note 11, art. 8, O.J. C 156/03, at 9 (1992);
Amended Proposal, supra note 24, art. 11, O.J. C 308/01, at 13-14 (1993).
272. See supra note 150.
273. According to the Council, the compulsory licensing provision was no
longer needed in light of the narrower scope of the sui generis rights and the exceptions provided in article 9. Common Position, supra note 150, Statement of
the Council’s Reasons 15, O.J. C 288/02, at 26-27 (1995). Both justifications seem
to contradict the terms of the Database Directive. First, although the sui generis
rights, as positively stated in the Amended Proposal, extended to “part or all” of
the database, see Amended Proposal, supra note 24, art. 10(1), O.J. C 308/01, at 13
(1993), the Database Directive still prohibits repeated and systematic extraction
of insubstantial parts if that extraction conflicts with the normal exploitation of
that database or unreasonably prejudices the maker’s rights. See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(3), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996); see also id. art. 8(2), O.J. L
77/20, at 26 (1996) (prohibiting users from performing any act; e.g., tampering
with the database, that conflicts with the normal exploitation of that database or
unreasonably prejudices the maker’s rights). Second, the “fair use” exceptions in
article 9 are optional within the Member States. See id. art. 9, O.J. L 77/20, at 26
(1996). Nonetheless, the Council’s citation to them as a reason for removing the
compulsory license indicates its intent that the exceptions be passed. See Common Position, supra note 150, Statement of the Council’s Reasons 15, O.J. C
288/02, at 26-27 (1995). Accordingly, even if a particular member state did not
enact the exceptions, they would probably be significant factors in any appeal to
the Commission regarding abuse of the sui generis rights. See infra notes 277-92
and accompanying text (discussing
274. See supra notes 262-70 and accompanying text.
275. For example, a solution that approximates pareto optimality. “Pareto
optimality” refers to the point at which no change can be implemented that will
make someone better off without making someone else worse off. See VISCUSI,
supra note 38, at 74-75.
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enable fair followers to protect the public’s interest in competition, but also provides shields to users who are not seeking to compete, but are performing functions deemed sufficiently important to provide exceptions to the sui generis
rights afforded database makers.276 While examining the
swords provided by the Database Directive, to fully understand the potential swath fair followers can cut with these
swords, one must simultaneously examine the arenas in
which they can be drawn and the decision-makers who will
determine whether these swords are required to protect the
public’s interest in competition in a given case.
1. The Swords: The European Economic
Community Treaty and Competition Law
Once fully implemented, the Database Directive’s sui
generis regime will, like other laws passed pursuant to the
European Economic Community (“EEC”) Treaty,277 take
precedence over national laws.278 However, the sui generis
rights are expressly limited by both national and Community rules of competition.279 As a result, a fair follower aggrieved by the anticompetitive behavior of a database maker
can file a complaint not only with the Commission of the
European Communities (“Commission”)280 if the anticompetitive behavior violates one of the EEC competition

276. See infra notes 294-318 and accompanying text.
277. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II).
278. See Corbet, supra note 29, at 330.
279. See Database Directive, supra note 1, recital 47, O.J. L 77/20, at 23 (1996).
The EC rules of competition are reported in Corbet, supra note 29, at note 84.
280. The Commission investigates and adjudicates complaints under Articles 85 and 86 that address the distortion of competition and the abuse of a
dominant position. Corbet, supra note 29, at 332. The Commission’s decision is
appealable to the Court of First Instance of the European Communities, and
questions of law are thereafter appealable to the Court of Justice of the European
Communities. Id.; see also Radio Telefis Eireann, [1995] E.C.R. at 828, ¶¶ 67-68 (appeal to Court of Justice only on questions of law, not facts).
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rules,281 but can also file a complaint in a national forum
based on violation of the EEC Treaty282 or any national competition rule.283
Perhaps the most powerful sword a fair follower can
wield is the one provided by Article 86 of the EEC Treaty
(“Article 86”). Article 86 prohibits the abuse of a dominant
position within the common market, or in a substantial part
of the common market, that affects trade between Member
States.284 Value-added competitors have effectively wielded
the sword afforded by Article 86 to force compulsory licenses even when copyright law buttressed the dominant
position.285
For example, in Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission
(“Magill”),286 the European Court of Justice upheld a compulsory licensing order forcing television broadcasters to
supply their weekly program listings to a competitor who
sought to produce a value-added product (a television program guide) not otherwise available on the market.287 If the
European Court of Justice is willing to vindicate the public’s
interest in competition for television program guides so the
281. See Corbet, supra note 29, at 347. The EEC competition rules include
articles 85-94 of the EEC Treaty, and other treaties. Id. at 348 n.84. Articles 85
and 86 of the EEC Treaty are by far the most important, id., and are the only ones
of concern in this Article.
282. Although national forums may apply EEC law, they must refer questions of EEC law to the European Court of Justice for an interlocutory and binding (in the case and as precedent) ruling. See Corbet, supra note 29, at 330-32.
283. In this regard, the Commission has noted the tendency of Member
States to redraft their national rules consistent with EEC law. See DAVISON ET AL.,
supra note 201, at 46-47.
284. See EEC Treaty, supra note 201, art. 86, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit.
T.S. No. 1.
285. See Radio Telefis Eireann, [1995] E.C.R. at 823, ¶ 50 (noting that failure to
supply information prevented new product from appearing on the market). As
the Magill court explained, “it is . . . clear . . . that the exercise of an exclusive
right by the proprietor may, in exceptional circumstances, involve abusive conduct.” Id. (citing Volvo AB v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., Case 238/87, [1988] E.C.R.
6211, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 122)).
286. Joined Cases, 241/91 & 242/91, [1995] E.C.R. 743; see supra note 136.
287. See Radio Telefis Eireann, [1995] E.C.R. at 837, ¶ 104, [1995].
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public
may
“arrange
[their]
leisure
activi288
ties . . . accordingly,”
how much more willing will the
Court be to vindicate that interest in areas vital to scientific
and technical progress?
In addition, to attack database makers who secure exclusive licenses, or otherwise engage in collusive activity to
thwart competition, fair followers can wield the sword provided by Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (“Article 85”).289
Taken together, Articles 85 and 86, and the “Excalibur-like”
pro-competitive sword found in Magill,290 along with the increasing willingness of European firms to abandon anticompetitive practices when challenged by the Commission,291
may be sufficient in and of themselves to protect the public’s
interest in competition by forcing would-be data monopolizers to supply their data on reasonable terms.292 Yet the Database Directive goes further by mandating a triennial review of the sui generis rights to determine whether the
public’s interest in free competition requires additional protective measures, including additional swords such as compulsory licenses, or additional shields such as the ones described below.293
288. Id. at 795, ¶ 173.
289. Article 85 prohibits “all agreements between undertakings . . . and concerted practices” which may prevent, restrict, or distort competition within the
common market. See EEC Treaty, supra note 201, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973
Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1.
290. The swords available to fair followers in the EC are preserved by
TRIPS. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
33 I.L.M. 1197, in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade
Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, Annex 1C, art. 40 (2) [hereinafter
TRIPs]; see also Fox, supra note 29, at 485 (“TRIPS reserves to nations the right to
control anticompetitive practices.”).
291. See DAVISON ET AL., supra note 201, at 46.
292. The Commission, whose proposals contained a compulsory licensing
requirement, see the Initial and Amended proposals, supra notes 11, 24 will be
available to the fair follower as an initial adjudicative body capable of compelling the license. See Corbet, supra note 29, at 322-23.
293. See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 16(3), O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996).
The drafters of the Database Directive intended that the same pro-competitive
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2. Mandatory and Optional Shields to Protect the
User
Unlike the swords afforded fair followers in the interests
of competition, the protections discussed in this section purport to act as shields to protect the legitimate rights of users
and others.294 The Database Directive mandates two shields
and permits Member States to enact three “fair use” shields.
Although the Council295 based its decision to eliminate the
compulsory licensing provision in part on the “fair use”
shields,296 their adoption remains optional to Member
States.297
a. The Mandatory Shields
The first mandatory shield deems public lending not an
act of extraction or utilization. Logically, this shield would
principles be available to fair followers seeking to compete with sui generis
rightholders. See Database Directive, supra note 1, recital 47, O.J. L 77/20, at 23
(1996). As explained in the Database Directive:
[I]n the interests of competition between suppliers of information products and services, protection by the sui generis right must not be afforded in such a way as to facilitate abuses of a dominant position, in
particular as regards the creation and ditribution [sic] of new products
and services which have an intellectual, documentary, technical, economic or commercial added value . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
294. Database Directive, supra note 1, recitals 49-51, O.J. L 77/20, at 23
(1996).
295. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
296. See Common Position, supra note 150, Statement of the Council’s Reasons 15, O.J. C 288/02, at 26-27 (1995) and Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 9,
O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996).
297. See Common Position, supra note 150, Statement of the Council’s Reasons 15, O.J. C 288/02, at 26-27 (1995) and Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 9,
O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996). The Parliament’s failure to require adoption of these
optional shields conflicts with the professed harmonization goals of the EC in
promulgating the Database Directive. See Common Position, supra note 150,
Statement of the Council’s Reasons 4, O.J. C 288/02, at 23 (1995). Failure to
mandate adoption of these shields by Member States could work especial hardships on academicians and scientists whose research knows no artificial territorial boundaries. See SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS, supra note 23, at 7-4 (explaining that scientific and academic research is an international undertaking
that knows now artificial geographic or political boundaries).
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belong to libraries, but it appeared in the Common Position
without comment or explanation.298
The second mandatory shield permits users to make insubstantial extractions and reutilizations for “any purposes
whatsoever.”299 “Any purposes whatsoever” is limited by
the correlative obligations imposed on users to refrain from
committing acts that “conflict with a normal exploitation of
the database or unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the maker of the database.”300 Given the unabashed
commercial focus of the Database Directive on the database
maker’s investment interests,301 users hiding behind this
shield should tread carefully when their use might prejudice
those commercial interests.
On the other hand, the commercial focus of the Database
Directive302 might aid those using database contents for noncommercial purposes. For example, a scientist recompiling
insubstantial portions of old data for noncommercial purposes, from a database whose commercial value derives
primarily from the timeliness of its data,303 could argue that
298. See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(2), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996).
However, logically library users would still be subject to limits of the Database
Directive; else, this provision would allow competitors to circumvent the protections afforded by the sui generis regime by accessing databases through libraries.
299. See id. art. 8(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996); see also id. art. 15, O.J. L 77/20,
at 27 (1996) (making contrary contractual provisions null and void). Apparently,
defining what constitutes an “insubstantial part” is a definitional task entrusted
to the European Court of Justice. See Gaster, supra note 128, at .
300. Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 8(2), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996); cf.
Berne Convention, supra note 8, art. 9(2), 828 U.N.T.S. at 238-39.
301. Database Directive, supra note 1, recitals 7-12, 38-42, 47, O.J. L 77/20, at
20, 22-23, art. 7, O.J. L 77/20, at 25 (1996); see also Common Position, supra note
150, Statement of the Council’s Reasons 14, O.J. C 288/02, at 26 (1995).
302. Database Directive, supra note 1, recitals 7-12, 38-42, 47, O.J. L 77/20, at
20, 22-23, art. 7, O.J. L 77/20, at 25 (1996); see also Common Position, supra note
150, Statement of the Council’s Reasons 14, O.J. C 288/02, at 26 (1995).
303. Note, however, that the value/price of data varies based on factors
other than just timeliness. For example, value-added features such as analyses,
verification, or accompanying analytical tools increase the price of data. In addition, data, like any other commodity, are subject to basic economic principles
such as the law of supply and demand. See generally ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH
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such activity does not prejudice the database maker’s legitimate, commercial interests.
Moreover, the commercial focus of the Database Directive may convince the European courts to examine the nature of the commercial interests affected when determining
whether an extraction or reutilization is “substantial.”304 For
example, a user extracting one week of old data can better
argue that such an extraction was legitimate, or insubstantial, than can a user who extracted one week of current,
timely data.305
Thus, the commercial focus of the Directive, coupled
with the Commission’s decision to leave the task of defining
“substantial part” to the European Court of Justice,306 permits the European courts to view users through a commercial lens to determine whether their extraction or reutilization prejudices the database maker’s legitimate, commercial
interests.
b. The Optional “Fair Use” Shields
The remaining “fair use” shields are optional and cannot
be exercised in such a way as to prejudice the database
maker’s rights.307 Some commentators argue that even if
Member States adopt these optional shields, the Database
Directive still fails to protect those advancing fundamental
science.308
OF NATIONS 49 (1776). For example, raw, real-time financial data (equity quotes)
can be obtained from several sources (such as CNNfn) free of charge (if one has
Internet access). However, because over time these same data become scarce
(only those who capture and store the real-time data will possess the data), the
supply curve shifts and, consequently, assuming the demand curve does not
shift proportionately in a corresponding direction, the price of these data increases. See generally MILTON H. SPENCER, CONTEMPORARY MACROECONOMICS 4356 (7th ed. 1990).
304. See supra notes 193, 301.
305. But see note 303.
306. See supra note 128.
307. Database Directive, supra note 1, recital 50, O.J. L 77/20, at 23 (1996).
308. See GLOBAL ACCESS, supra note 4, at 13-14 (arguing that these shields are
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Assuming the Member States adopt these shields, they
collectively allow extraction of substantial parts of publiclyavailable databases for private purposes in the case of
nonelectronic databases, and for illustration in teaching and
for scientific research, provided the user indicates the source,
to the extent justified by the noncommercial purpose; and
extraction and reutilization of substantial parts for public security, administrative, or judicial purposes.309
The first optional shield, which permits extraction of substantial parts of publicly-available databases for private purposes,310 illogically distinguishes between nonelectronic and
electronic databases. By using high-speed scanners and optical character recognition software, nonelectronic databases
can be electronically converted almost as easily as electronic
databases.311 Moreover, the reasons given by the Council for
extending the scope of the Database Directive to include
nonelectronic databases apply equally here, but apparently
received no consideration.312
The second optional shield, which permits extraction of
substantial parts of publicly-available databases for illustration for teaching or for scientific research,313 could go far in
ameliorating the concerns of those decrying the Database Directive’s sui generis regime because of its potential effect on
research.314 Provided the user indicates the source, and can
justify the use as noncommercial, only the database maker’s
legitimate interests limit the user’s ability to use the contents
of the database for the “purposes of illustration for teaching
of little use to those conducting scientific research).
309. Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 9, O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996). The
third and final optional shield, permitting not only extraction, but also reutilization of substantial parts of the database, in the interests of public security, and
for the purposes of administrative or judicial procedures, is not discussed herein.
310. Id. art. 9(a), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996).
311. See supra note 190.
312. See Common Position, supra note 150, Statement of the Council’s Reasons 8, O.J. C 288/02, at 24 (1995).
313. Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 9(b), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996).
314. See supra note 23.
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or scientific research.”315
Some argue that this second optional shield is merely
“fool’s gold,” which reinforces the overly protective thrust of
the Database Directive.316 Under this view, the scientist can
illustrate his or her conclusions, but cannot browse the database or use the collected data without succumbing to the
monopoly power of the sole-source database maker. Although one could read the Database Directive in this manner, a careful, contextual reading supports the previous
view:317 noncommercial uses of the database contents for the
purposes of illustration for teaching or for scientific research
is limited only by the legitimate interests of the database
maker.318
Even if the European courts follow the parsimonious
view of the second optional shield, the fact remains that
anyone, including individual academicians or collective scientific and technical institutions, can become database makers.319 This fact should not be dismissed lightly, either by legal or economic theorists, or by commercial data compilers,
because, by wielding the rights afforded by the Database Directive’s sui generis regime, the information-producing aca-

315. Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 9, O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996); see supra note 305.
316. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 89-90.
317. Id. The latter view ignores the difference between the shield provided
in the copyright domain and the shield provided in the sui generis domain. Compare Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 6(2)(b), O.J. L 77/20, at 25 (1996) (“for
the sole purpose of illustration for teaching or scientific research”) (copyright domain) with Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 9(b), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996)
(for the purposes of illustration for teaching or scientific research) (sui generis do(noting that the excepmain) (emphasis added); cf. Gaster, supra note 128, at
tions “usually only relate to the extraction right . . . because re-utilization is predominantly of a commercial nature”).
318. Logically, the database maker’s legitimate interests will be broader visà-vis the academic or scientist if the database is designed for, and marketed to,
the academic or scientific communities. However, the scientist or academic can
still resort to the mandatory shields discussed above.
319. See supra note 13.
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demic and scientific communities320 could potentially become gatekeepers to the technical and scientific data market.321
The significance of the scientific and academic communities fending for themselves in a commercialized information
market is considered more fully in the context of the opportunities and threats to basic science discussed in Part IV of
this Article. For now, it is sufficient to note that even if the
second optional shield proves to be “fool’s gold,” the swords
and shields available in the EC should ensure that the toll
fence raised by the Database Directive remains a procompetitive fence, not an insuperable monopolistic wall.322
D. Effects within the European Community
Although the shadow of protection cast by the Database
Directive’s sui generis regime will remain uncertain until interpreted by the authoritative administrative and judicial
bodies, to the extent that legal protections create incentives
320. See, e.g., SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS, supra note 23, at 5-30 (noting that, in 1993 alone, 414,000 articles were published in the 4,681 peer-reviewed
natural science and engineering journals recognized in the Institute of Scientific
Information’s Scientific Citation Index).
321. Indeed, the scientific community has begun to assume this role in some
scientific disciplines. See, e.g., Paul Ginsparg, Winners and Losers in the Global Research Village 3 (visited May 11, 1997) <http://www.lanl.gov/blurb/
pg96unesco.html> (noting that automated online archives of physics research,
contributed by the scientific community, has virtually supplanted conventional
journals); see also J. C. Sens, Electronic Publishing via Scientific Societies (visited
May 11, 1997) <http://www.grainger.uiuc.edu/icsu/sens.htm> (outlining a
proposal for a non-profit organization to provide unreviewed scientific articles
free of charge, and to provide reviewed articles at a cost sufficient to finance the
non-profit organization). If this trend continues, the “freedom of information”
position taken by some in the academic and scientific communities will be put to
the test, and we shall see precisely how “free” those communities believe information should be.
322. But cf. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 90 (arguing that the protection afforded by the Database Directive to data is exceeded only by the protection granted by the classic patent paradigm); see also GLOBAL ACCESS, supra note
4, at 35 (arguing that under “an exclusive rights model . . . a database owner[]
[has an] absolute monopoly . . . .”).
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to produce,323 the sui generis regime should increase database
production in the EC.324 At the same time, the United States
Supreme Court has left diligent compilers in the United
States vulnerable to the misappropriative efforts of parasitic
competitors and information Samaritans.325 Unless the
United States adopts a regime providing equivalent protection, the synergistic effect of these two factors, coupled with
the increasing convergence of the European market, may indeed help the EC achieve their goal of gaining a larger share
of the worldwide database market.326
With respect to nonproprietary data, the Database Directive’s sui generis regime should increase information availability and accessibility within the EC by increasing production incentives.327 In addition, because protection is linked
to production costs, rather than the superficial form of the
final product, the Database Directive’s sui generis regime
should operate without the price-distorting effects of an enhanced copyright regime.328
While increased information availability and accessibility
under the Database Directive’s sui generis regime will come
at a certain price, absent adequate production incentives in323. Perritt, supra note 4, at 261 (citing Locke and Blackstone); Karjala II, supra note 38, at 2594 (explaining that an absence of legal protection for intellectual
property acts as a disincentive to invest); Lunney, supra note 64, at 486 n.5 (property rights are used to provide incentives to invest in intellectual property production); Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 349.
324. See Samuelson, supra note 11, at 6 (pointing out that the two countries
with the biggest market share have historically protected “noncreative” labors of
database makers through “sweat of the brow” and “industrious collection” rationales). However, the Database Directive’s sui generis regime could reduce incentives in Great Britain where ‘sweat-of-the-brow’ databases already enjoy protection under copyright law. See supra note 8.
325. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340
(1991); supra note 10 (discussing information Samaritans).
326. See Database Directive, supra note 1, recitals 11-12, O.J. L 77/20, at 20
(1996).
327. See supra notes 236, 322-23.
328. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text; see also Denicola, supra
note 12, at 530.
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formation seekers still pay a price: instead of paying a fee to
access an available database, information seekers pay in the
form of lost-opportunity costs—costs incurred in the form of
time and effort expended in finding the information,329 assuming the information can be found at all. Thus, in the case
of nonproprietary data, the Database Directive will give information seekers an otherwise unavailable choice: pay the
gatherer for her efforts and marshal their energies toward
uses they deem more valuable, or gather their own data.330
In contrast, in the case of some proprietary or sole-source
data, information seekers are not given a choice—they cannot practicably go forth and gather their own data.331 However, the swords and shields available in the EC may inject
enough legal uncertainty in the minds of would-be data monopolizers to encourage them to engage in reasonable behavior vis-à-vis competitors and others seeking licenses.332 In
light of these mechanisms, and the Database Directive’s
mandated triennial assessment of the sui generis rights concerning abusive and anticompetitive behavior,333 concerns
regarding the Database Directive’s anticompetitive effects
and effect on information flow within the EC,334 while not
eliminated, are probably overstated.335
IV. THE DATABASE DIRECTIVE: STEPPING STONE TO AN

329. See generally A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1989).
330. Because of the explosive growth of the Internet the latter choice is becoming increasingly available. See supra notes 230-31.
331. See supra note 199 (defining “sole-source data”).
332. Cf. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 149 (arguing that the legal
uncertainty arising from fair use requirements gives producers and users
“maximum incentives to negotiate . . . licenses” on reasonable terms).
333. See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 16, O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996);
see also id. recital 47, O.J. L 77/20, at 23 (1996).
334. See supra notes 22-23, 205 and accompanying text.
335. It seems more plausible to assume that the EC will respond to problems
associated with the Database Directive, than to assume that it will continue
shooting itself in the foot after a problem is detected.
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INTERNATIONAL MODEL
This part first proposes that any international sui generis
regime modeled on the Database Directive be modified by
incorporating a compulsory licensing mechanism to enable
competition in the case of sole-source data. This part then
examines the purported hazards lurking, and the opportunities awaiting, the scientific and academic communities in an
environment that privately allocates information based upon
price.
A. Enabling Competition in a Commercialized Information
Market
Collectively, the Database Directive, along with supranational and national European competition laws (“European
competition law”), provide ameliorative mechanisms sufficient to offset, or permit downstream adjustments to compensate for, the potential problems associated with a regime
which may permit de facto, although not de jure, ownership
rights in sole-source data.336 However, similar ameliorative
mechanisms, like the pro-competitive “Excalibur-like” sword
found in Magill and other pro-competition policies embedded in European competition law,337 are not available at an
international level.338 Consequently, an international sui
generis regime may require a mechanism to ensure that new
and value-added information products are not kept off the
market by those who refuse to license sole-source data.339

336. See supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 277-92 and accompanying text.
338. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 29, at 487-90 (noting the lack of any coherent
international competition law and discussing five scenarios where the two major
models, United States antitrust law and EC competition law, would likely differ
in application).
339. See, e.g., Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 77.
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1. Mandating Licenses in the Case of Sole-Source
Data
One such mechanism, found in the sui generis regime initially proposed by the EC, is a compulsory licensing
scheme.340 A compulsory licensing mechanism could be
loosely modeled on the compulsory licensing mechanism
copyright provides for nondramatic musical works.341 Properly designed, such a mechanism could enhance competition
in a fully commercialized information market by ensuring
that value-added products are not kept off the market by database makers who refuse to license sole-source data, and by
ensuring that the specter of competition hovers as a potential
restraint on those database makers inclined to seek monopolistic rents for sole-source data.
2. Compulsory Licenses Should Serve the Interests
of the Database Maker and the Public
A compulsory licensing mechanism could be designed
with a dual rate structure, one based on a statutory minimum rate, the other based upon the database maker’s actual
costs. Such a rate structure could protect the public’s interest in competition in the sole-source data market without
unduly prejudicing the commercial interests of the database
maker.
As a starting point, the statutory rate could be determined by multiplying the number of bytes342 reused or ex-

340. See Initial Proposal, supra note 11, art. 8, O.J. C 156/03, at 9 (1992);
Amended Proposal, supra note 24, art. 11, O.J. C 308/01, at 13-14 (1993) (mandating compulsory licenses on “fair and nondiscriminatory terms” in the case of
sole-source data); cf. Reichman, supra note 10, at 2539-44 (proposing off-the-rack
liability regime with built-in compulsory license); see also Samuelson et al., supra
note 35, at 2412-14.
341. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C.A. § 115 (West Supp. 1996).
342. “Byte” is a term used to quantify data streams. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 194 (3d ed. 1993) (defining a “byte” as equivalent to one character or eight bits).
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tracted times a small charge, such as a fraction of a cent, or
other appropriate monetary unit.343 Alternatively, database
makers should remain free to reject the statutory rate in favor of a second rate structure based upon actual costs.
Under this second rate structure, the database maker
should bear the burden of proving actual costs associated
with particular data, but could thereafter charge accordingly.344 This rate structure would legitimately enable database makers with high data-collection costs, or narrow markets over which to spread their data-collection costs, to
recover a greater proportion of their costs from would-be
competitors.
343. Cf. 17 U.S.C.A. § 115 (covering mechanical copyright royalties). A further refinement of the compulsory licensing scheme might include a prohibition
on substantial electronic extraction and conversion by competitors for a short
blocking period designed to provide the maker with sufficient lead-time to recover her costs in the market. Cf. Samuelson et al., supra note 35, at 2412-14
(blocking period followed by compulsory license); see also Reichman, supra note
10, at 2544-51. In addition, a compulsory licensing mechanism might encourage
formation of private collection societies which would permit interested parties to
bargain around the statutory rate. Cf. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at
140 (noting that the Harry Fox agency acts as a “de facto collection society
[for] . . . some 200,000 voluntary licenses . . .”); cf. Kennedy & Dweck, supra note
53, at C17 (reporting that the Author’s Guild and the American Society of Journalists formed the Author’s Registry this year to represent freelance writers in an
effort to impose usage-based royalties on publishers for electronic uses of their
works). Professors Reichman and Samuelson suggest that a statutory rate be set
by industry in light of two criteria: (1) the cost-recovery principle familiar to scientific agencies, which focuses on the reasonableness of profit margins, and (2)
the value the licensed data adds to the fair follower’s product. See Reichman &
Samuelson, supra note 4, at 140. They also suggest that a statutory rate would
result in bargaining by users and producers, and would permit “a more nuanced
schedule of royalties . . . than a statute could . . . institute.” Id. at 141.
344. Although the database maker might incur additional costs in proving
actual costs, proving them should be less costly than triggering competition law
because the maker need only produce reliable evidence of her data collection
costs. Moreover, since each sui generis regime saddles the database maker with
the burden of proving substantial investment, the prudent database maker will
have adequate documentation of investment costs. See Database Directive, supra
note 1, art. 7(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 25 (1996); H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, §§ 2,
3(a), 6(a); WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, Note 2.07 WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug.
30, 1996) (“[i]n any dispute, it is the burden of the maker of the database to demonstrate the necessary investment”); see also Gaster, supra note 128, at
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At the same time, users and competitors seeking to use
the sole-source data should remain free to challenge database makers who opt for the second rate structure, and
should reap the benefits of a successful challenge by obtaining the data at lesser of the statutory rate or the actual
cost.345 Finally, to further encourage bargaining, and to finance the administrative mechanism to arbitrate actual cost
disputes, the loser could be assessed costs, including costs
incurred by the other party and administrative costs. Such a
dual rate structure could accommodate a negotiated “menu
of liability options”346 analogous to Professors Reichman and
Samuelson’s proposal for a liability regime,347 without unfairly saddling database makers with the bill for subsidizing
downstream data users.
3. Prohibiting Exclusive Licensing Arrangements
To further ensure that competition reigns in the data
market, exclusive licensing arrangements with sole-source
data producers could be deemed void against public policy.
Thus modified by introducing liability principles,348 an international sui generis regime modeled on the Database Directive could ensure that competition performs its protective
role349 even in the case of sole-source data.350
345. If the database industry chose to form a collection society to minimize
transaction costs associated with licensing, the first appeal might lie within the
collection society. See supra note 342. Thereafter, either party could appeal the
actual cost determination to an appropriate court or, if the mechanism so provides, an arbitration committee.
346. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 141.
347. Id.
348. See Initial Proposal, supra note 11, art. 8, O.J. C 156/03, at 9 (1992);
Amended Proposal, supra note 24, art. 11, O.J. C 308/01, at 13-14 (1993) (mandating compulsory licenses on “fair and nondiscriminatory terms” in the case of
sole-source data); cf. Reichman, supra note 10, at 2539-44 (proposing off-the-rack
liability regime with built-in compulsory license); see also Samuelson et al., supra
note 35, at 2412-14; cf. 17 U.S.C.A. § 115.
349. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d at 1453 (citation omitted) (noting that competition
protects consumers in a free market economy).
350. See supra note 199 (defining “sole-source data”).
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A compulsory licensing mechanism will not, however,
aid competition in markets without sufficient demand to
support additional competitors: neither will it aid competition in areas where information is provided under nonmarket conditions, the conditions under which some scientists
perform basic research and development.351
B. Potential Effects on Basic Research and Development
Assessing the role research352 and development353
(“R&D”) plays in technological innovation, and its resulting
societal effects, is an extremely complex task.354 The complexity of the task stems in part from the complexity in fund-

351. For example, scientists and other users can obtain publicly-funded information on a cost-recovery basis by the United States to scientists and other
users. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West Supp. 1996);
GLOBAL ACCESS, supra note 4, at 22; Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 113.
In addition, the Electronic Freedom of Information Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104231, 110 Stat. 3048 (effective October 2, 1996), requires federal agencies to provide that information in “any form or format requested . . . if the [information] is
readily reproducible by the agency in that form or format.” See 5 U.S.C.A. §
552(a)(3)(B).
352. Conventional innovation models, which presume a linear innovation
process, generally divide research into two levels: basic and applied. See
SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS, supra note 23, at 4-9. “Basic research” seeks
to further scientific knowledge for its own sake, without regard to specific applications. Id. “Applied research” seeks to determine the means by which a particular, specified need can be met. Id. However, most innovation experts recognize that the innovation process is far more complex than the linear model
suggests. See id. (citing Donald Stokes forthcoming book, PASTEUR’S QUADRANT).
Stokes classifies research into three levels: pure basic research (research conducted solely in the quest for basic understanding), pure applied research (research conducted solely for its potential use), and strategic research (research
conducted both for its potential use and for basic understanding). Id. As used
herein, “basic research” means pure basic research. In addition, except when
stated otherwise, this section examines data reflecting only United States research and development patterns.
353. “Development” is the systematic use of the products of research,
knowledge and understanding, toward the production of useful products, processes, or services. SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS, supra note 23, at 4-9.
354. The complexity stems not only from informational difficulties, but also
from differing analytical and philosophical approaches. Id. at 8-3 (citations omitted).
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ing the R&D process,355 from the difficulties in assessing the
spillover effects of R&D,356 and from the difficulties in attaching value to the benefits derived from technological
growth.357 This section does not attempt such a monumental
task, but rather attempts only a general assessment of the
potential effects of a sui generis regime which protects the investment of database makers, on a subcomponent of the
R&D process: “basic research.”358
According to some of those charged with conducting basic research, even if an international sui generis regime is not

355. In the United States, R&D is performed and funded by industry, government, and academia. See id. at 4-2. Of the $171 billion spent on R&D in the
United States in 1995, 60% was spent on development, 23% was spent on applied
research, and 17% (approximately $29.6 billion) was spent on basic research. See
id. at 4-9 Although industry funds and performs the majority of overall R&D,
the majority of industry funds are spent on applied research and development.
See id. at 4-5 to 4-7 (reporting that, in 1995, industry provided approximately 59%
of total R&D expenditures in the United States, and performed approximately
70% of the total R&D). In the area of basic research, the federal government provides the majority of funding, while the academic sector performs most of the
basic research. SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS, supra note 23, at 4-9 (reporting that federally-allocated funds comprised approximately 58% of the $29.6 billion spent on basic research); see id. (reporting that academia performed approximately 50% of basic research conducted in the United States in 1995).
Although all three sectors have experienced a reduction in the rate of growth in
dollars spent on research and development, academia is the only sector that has
experienced a constant dollar increase since 1986. Id.
356. Because basic research is often shared among scientists, e.g., by publication in scientific journals and by private circulation among colleagues, it is difficult for those conducting the research to capture the ripple effects, or spillover
benefits produced by the research. See id. at 8-6 to 8-7. In addition, initial research may find application (“spillover”) in other industrial sectors and scientific
disciplines. See id. at 6-4, 8-6, to 8-7. Finally, the ripple effect of basic research
conducted in academic institutions represents a “crucial component in training
future scientists and engineers, many of whom will one day be working in [industrial] laboratories.” SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS, supra note 23, at 4-10.
357. For example, the difficulties inherent in attaching a monetary value to
technological breakthroughs that save human lives; or, in attaching a monetary
value to the more general benefit of promoting a “culture of reasoned discourse.”
See id. at 8-10 to 8-11.
358. Unlike “applied research,” which seeks to determine the means by
which a particular, specified need can be met, “basic research” seeks to further
scientific knowledge without regard to specific application. See id. at 4-9.
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adopted, the Database Directive may cause a paradigmatic
shift in the way basic research is conducted.359 This concern
rests on the argument that because the Database Directive’s
sui generis regime may create de facto property rights in basic
research data, the “principle of full and open exchange” will
give way to “mini-monopolies” which will in turn significantly diminish long-term R&D capabilities.360 The following subsection delineates those concerns.
1. Concerns Expressed by Those Conducting Basic
Research
Opponents of the Database Directive’s sui generis regime,
and of an international sui generis regime modeled on the
Database Directive, cite three main concerns, all of which
center on the effect of such a regime on the accessibility of
data.361 First, they argue that an international sui generis regime will give database makers an absolute monopoly on
data.362 Because of this exclusive right in data, critics claim,
the database maker will either deny access or charge a price
that science cannot pay.363
359. See, e.g., GLOBAL ACCESS, supra note 4, at 27; Academy Letter, supra note
23, at 2 (discussing “ethos of sharing”); see generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
360. See GLOBAL ACCESS, supra note 4, at 14; Academy Letter, supra note 23,
at 2; Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 91; Rosler, supra note 11, at 140-41.
361. However, even those opposing the current proposals agree that the
“core idea underlying current sui generis proposals is sound, even if the mechanisms proposed to address the problem are flawed.” See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 130. Additional concerns expressed by opponents were
addressed previously with respect to Database Directive’s effects within the EC.
See supra notes 277-321 and accompanying text.
362. See Academy Letter, supra note 23, at 1-2; Reichman & Samuelson, supra
note 4, 90-102 (arguing that each regime grants monopoly rights); GLOBAL
ACCESS, supra note 4, at 35 (arguing that under “an exclusive rights model . . . a
database owner[] [has an] absolute monopoly”).
363. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 115-16; see also GLOBAL
ACCESS, supra note 4, at 8-9. Although the sui generis regime may lead to higher
data costs, in the form of fees or independent generation costs, charging for data
is not a revolutionary concept. Information is not, nor has it ever been free—
someone, whether it be the government, or other information users who subsi-
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Second, opponents argue that, because any entity can
find protection under such a sui generis regime,364 foreign
governments will enter the database markets and charge
market prices for publicly-funded data previously supplied
on a cost-recovery basis.365 Critics project that this development, coupled with the incentive to privatize data, will result in an ever-shrinking pool of public domain information.366
Finally, opponents argue that the incentive to privatize
data created by such a regime is antithetical to the principle
of “full and open exchange” of scientific data.367 Critics
speculate that the collective effect of this “parade of horribles,”368 which would follow adoption of such a sui generis
regime,369 could have grave consequences to the United
States’ ability to maintain its lead in technological innovation.370
2. Potential Benefits to Those Conducting Basic
Research
Although de facto property rights in data causes much
concern to those whose lifeblood is data, a regime which
dize information pirates and parasites, has always paid the price. See Pamela
Samuelson, Information as Property: D. Ruckelshaus and Carpenter, Signal Changing
Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 367 (1989). Moreover, in some degree information has always existed as a commodity available to
those with the wherewithal to purchase it. Id.
364. However, note that H.R. 3531 specifically excludes governmental agencies and employees in their official capacity from the scope of its protection. See
H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 2.
365. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 115-16; GLOBAL ACCESS, supra note 4, at 15.
366. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 117, 128; see also GLOBAL
ACCESS, supra note 4, at 34-35.
367. See Academy Letter, supra note 23, at 2; Reichman & Samuelson, supra
note 4, at 114 (arguing that basic science requires an abundant infusion of “cheap
data in ways that encourage serendipity and playful exploration”).
368. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 128.
369. Id.
370. See id. at 115-17.
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grants the commercial database maker a de facto property
right in data grants the same right to the dedicatedresearcher-turned-database-maker.371 Thus, while the potential negative effects demand careful attention by policy makers before adopting an international sui generis regime modeled on the Database Directive,372 policy makers should
assess the potential negative effects in light of the potential
benefits to those decrying the Directive and the Proposals it
has spawned, and in light of the potential benefits to society
as a whole.
a. Market Participation
Those conducting basic research and their employers,
universities, for example, are not only data users, but are
also data producers. As data producers, researchers can engage the market for protection. For example, the academic
and scientific communities might collectively organize and
form large databases fed continually by their respective
communities.373 Given the sheer volume of information
371. Moreover, the term of the de facto monopoly will be determined by the
difficulty of unearthing the data and the relevant database market. That is, the
data collector will face price competition earlier, or data users will independently
generate the data, if data are relatively easy to independently discover and generate. Conversely, if data are relatively difficult to discover or generate, the data
collector may receive a longer term of protection.
372. These effects should also be considered by EC members when implementing the Database Directive. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 108
(noting that even if an international sui generis regime is not adopted, the Database Directive may force a paradigmatic shift in the way scientists, academics,
and others operating in a noncompetitive or subsidized environment, conduct
research and other information-intensive activities); see also GLOBAL ACCESS, supra note 4, at 25-26 (arguing that EC members should implement the Database
Directive by freighting “data generated by public funds . . . with a built-in, costbased discount for scientific research and education as a condition of further
commercialization by others”).
373. Although this may require some logistical nimbleness, given today’s
software tools, it takes relatively little programming expertise to form a database
which would find protection under the Database Directive. Moreover, the academic research community typically has ready access to programming expertise
and computer hardware. Griffith Interview, supra note 40. In addition, formation
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produced by these communities,374 an international sui generis regime might not only provide these communities with
significant bargaining power in the commercial sector, but
might also empower these communities to influence
fundamental information policy.
Moreover, armed with this new-found bargaining power,
the academic and scientific communities could engage the
market in a number of ways. For example, they could engage commercial database makers in partnerships, providing data in exchange for innovative research tools and cost
recovery access.375
Alternatively, the academic and scientific communities
could choose to enter the market as database makers.376 As
market participants, these communities could employ the resulting profits to replace ever-shrinking governmental
funds,377 to pay for production costs, to pay for additional
research and educational activities, or to pay individual researchers via a collection society.378
of a collection society might reduce transaction costs which might otherwise
make small transactions cost-prohibitive. See Thomas K. Landry, Columbia-VLA
Journal of Law & The Arts Roundtable on Electronic Rights, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 605, 645 (1996).
374. See supra note 320.
375. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, 108-10; cf. SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS, supra note 23, at 5-43 (noting that the strong upward trend
in gross revenues generated by academic patenting indicates an awareness and
willingness on the part of private industry to invest in academia) citing a 1994
survey conducted by the Association of University Technology Managers, Inc.
376. See Hunsucker, supra note 219, at 35-36; cf. SCIENCE & ENGINEERING
INDICATORS, supra note 23, at 5-42 (noting that the sevenfold increase in the number of patents awarded to the academic sector between 1960 and 1980 suggests
that the academic sector is attempting to capture some of the economic benefits
associated with basic research).
377. See, e.g., id. at 4-21 (noting the decline, in real terms, of overall federal
R&D expenditures).
378. Cf. BIERDERMAN, ET AL., LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE ENTERTAINMENT
INDUSTRIES 526-27 (3d ed. 1996) (describing ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC, collection
societies who collect and distribute fees generated by performing rights); see also
Landry, supra note 373, at 642 (describing the Authors Registry, a collection society which collects royalties on electronic distribution of written articles).
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b. An International Treaty Addressing PubliclyFunded Data
While some governmental data are not reproducible and
may not be subject to the limits of a competitive market,379
many of these data are presently available on a cost-recovery
basis pursuant to bilateral or multilateral treaties.380 Additionally, although foreign governments may use the sui
generis regime to finance government-sponsored research efforts, or may discriminate against researchers in the United
States,381 there are practical limits on the ability of foreign
governments to do so.
Consider, for example, that the United States accounts for
approximately forty-four percent of the world’s R&D investment, outdistancing the next four largest investors combined.382 Governments who discriminate against researchers
in the United States, or who charge market prices for publicly-funded data, risk similar treatment from the United
States. The threat of retaliation by the United States might
act as an implicit limit on the price foreign governments
charge for publicly-funded data.
Moreover, rather than face the wrath of its own citizens
by charging market prices for publicly-financed data, the
United States might exercise its strength in R&D to persuade
379. For example, data provided via governmentally-operated satellites.
See, e.g., GLOBAL ACCESS, supra note 4, at 22.
380. Id.; see also Bilateral Relations, Executive Summary 6 (visited Nov. 11,
1996)
(noting that “during
FY-1995 there were 805 S&T [Science & Technology] agreements in force between the U.S. and 78 other countries.” For a representative listing of the current
bilateral agreements, see
In addition, one should note that international scientific collaboration and cooperation is increasing. See SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS,
supra note 23, at 5-35-37 (noting greater international collaboration on scientific
and engineering articles); 4-42-48 (noting increasing international collaboration
in the public and private sectors).
381. See supra note 365.
382. SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS, supra note 23, at 4-35 and tables 433-4-35 (note that these data reflect total R&D, not just basic research).
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foreign governments to supply publicly-financed data to science on reasonable terms.383 Alternatively, foreign action
regarding publicly-funded data which the United States perceives as unfair may precipitate a single international treaty
addressing publicly-funded data.384
c. Reducing Inefficiencies Masked by Hidden
Subsidies
Subjecting basic research to the discipline of a commercialized data market may reduce hidden costs imposed by
the systemic inefficiencies associated with research conducted under less-than-market conditions. For example,
openly charging for data may give users a financial incentive
to make decisions based upon actual need, which may result
in more focused research.
In contrast, “free” access to information, which is not
really free but rather subsidized by someone else, may encourage unnecessary and unfocused research on systems
with finite capacities, which may render systems unavailable
to others. Thus, attaching a market price to information may
lead to wider data availability and accessibility by freeing
what would otherwise be unavailable system capacity.
d. Not a Threat to Technological Innovation
Even if imposing additional costs on basic research,
whether in the form of fees or of independent generation
costs, shifts the focus of basic research from the discovery of
knowledge for its own sake to the discovery of knowledge to
solve a particular societal problem, it does not necessarily

383. See, e.g., GLOBAL ACCESS, supra note 4, at 27; see also supra note 351 (citing the Freedom of Information Act).
384. For example, an international treaty might require governments to
supply their data on “fair and nondiscriminatory terms.” See supra note 338; cf.
GLOBAL ACCESS, supra note 4, at 25 (arguing that publicly-funded data should
come freighted with a built-in discount for science).
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follow that such a shift will reduce the number of technological breakthroughs. On the contrary, some empirical evidence suggests that technological breakthroughs are just as
likely to precede, rather than follow, basic research.385
Thus, while the Database Directive’s sui generis regime,
or an international sui generis regime modeled on the Database Directive, poses risks to academic and scientific researchers, it also presents many opportunities to those same
researchers (or those making the substantial investment in
database production), including the opportunity to recover
some spillover subsidies they currently provide to the industrial sector.386
C. Potential Benefits to Society
Like the railroad of yesteryear, information is the engine
that drives commercial innovation and social advancement;387 it is the cornerstone of electronic commerce.388 Mil385. See supra note 350 (regarding linear/nonlinear innovation models); see
also SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS, supra note 23, at 4-9 (citing Donald
Stokes forthcoming book, PASTEUR’S QUADRANT, which sets forth examples of
real world technological breakthroughs accomplished by those such as Pasteur,
Faraday, and Kelvin, whose research focused on both fundamental understanding and potential application; see also id. at 5-42 (noting that the academic sector,
which performs most of the basic research, is increasingly focusing on commercially relevant technologies).
386. See supra note 354.
387. See WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, Preamble WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6
(Aug. 30, 1996) (“[D]atabases are a vital element in the development of a global
information infrastructure and an essential tool for promoting economic, cultural, and technological advancement . . . .” ; 142 CONG. REC. E890-04 (daily ed.
May 23, 1996) (statement of Sen. Moorhead) (“[D]atabases . . . the linchpin of a
dynamic commercial industry in the United States.”); Database Directive, supra
note 1, recital 9, O.J. L 77/20, at 20 (1996); cf. Rockwell Graphic Sys. v. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991) (“The future of the nation depends in no
small part on the efficiency of industry, . . . [which in turn] depends in no small
part on the protection of intellectual property.”); see also Samuelson, supra note
363, at 367 (“In the information age, information becomes the primary economic
commodity, the source of greatest wealth”); see generally, Jared Sandberg, Microsoft Plans to Spend Big on the Internet, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1996, at B3 (reporting
that Microsoft plans to spend $400 million this year to development information
content for its Internet services).
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lions of information users, including scientists, professionals,
scholars, consumers, and businessmen and women, make
decisions based upon information every day.389 To the extent that a sui generis regime protecting investment in databases increases the production of databases, a tool that enhances information users’ ability to retrieve the kernel of
information needed to solve a particular scientific, legal,
economic, or medical problem, the regime would enhance
society’s problem-solving abilities, increase productivity and
decrease lost-opportunity costs,390 advance education and
training, and facilitate the creation of a better-informed citizenry.391
Additionally, a sui generis regime protecting investment
in databases could produce profound long-term societal
benefits if such a regime subtly shifts macroeconomic incentives from fictional works to more necessary factual works392
having higher social utility.393 That is, assuming that legal
protections create or protect incentives to produce, to the extent protection afforded factual works approaches or exceeds
the protection afforded fictional works, societal resources
388. See, e.g., Bradford L. Smith, Creating the Global Information Society: Looking Ahead, in 2 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW & POLICY
(Hugh C. Hansen ed., forthcoming 1997) (explaining that users do not want new
telecommunications equipment and computer hardware for its own sake, but
rather for the information it allows them to access)
389. 142 CONG. REC. E890-04 (daily ed. May 23, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Moorhead).
390. The lost opportunity costs consist of costs suffered by society in the
form of nonproductive time spent searching for information. See generally A.
MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1989).
391. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. E890-04 (daily ed. May 23, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Moorhead).
392. Although one could correct the imbalance by reducing the protection
currently afforded traditionally copyrightability works to little more than protection against wholesale copying, that solution seems unlikely given the vested interests in the copyright regime. See generally Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining
Copyrights’ Incentive Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483 (1996).
393. By according factual works only a thin veil of copyright protection because of their high degree of social utility, society has implicitly, if not explicitly,
deemed factual works more valuable than fictional works. See Lunney, supra
note 65, at 568-70.
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should be redirected toward production of factual works.394
Society would thus reap the benefit of increased production
of more necessary factual information.
CONCLUSION
Market-destructive
appropriators,
commerciallymotivated or not, skew incentives to invest in information
generation and compilation. The EC took a bold, intellectually-honest step forward by adopting a sui generis regime to
protect investment in databases. The Directive’s sui generis
regime does not create exclusive legal property rights in
data, but does protect the investment of labor and capital,
made by diligent compilers, in their compilations. By linking protection to the investment of capital and labor, the Database Directive’s sui generis regime should increase, or at
least preserve, incentives to collect and compile information
in the EC. Because independent creation and imitation remain, as they should, perfectly legitimate means of competition, the Directive’s sui generis regime protects compilers
without unnecessarily suspending the principles of free
competition in the nonproprietary data market.
At the same time, this Article recognizes the risk of impeding competition in the sole-source data market and the
incentives to privatize data that such a regime creates.
Nonetheless, there are sufficient ameliorative measures
available to those within the EC to offset these risks, not the
least of which is the fact that European courts will, if following the spirit of the Directive, focus on the legitimate commercial interests of the database maker when defining infringement. On the other hand, because of the lack of similar
ameliorative measures at the international level, this Article
suggests that an international sui generis regime modeled on
394. See id. at 655-56; see Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 349 (the extent of copyright protection for databases influences the initial investment decision); see also
supra note 323.
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the Database Directive be modified by incorporating a compulsory mechanism to protect the public’s interest in competition in the sole-source database and information markets.
However, this Article does not agree with those who believe information should be free. Society gains little by making information free if, by so doing, it reduces the quantity
and quality of information produced, or reduces the monetary value attached to socially-productive behavior like basic
research.
On the other hand, if increasing the price of data results
in greater remuneration to information producers, for example, those engaged in basic research and science, society may
attach a higher value to such socially-productive behavior,
which in turn could result in more scientists and researchers,
who could in turn produce more information. Thus, greater
remuneration to researchers and scientists may result in
spillover effects that could have far-reaching social implications. What, for example, might children think if society
paid the next dedicated researcher laying the foundation for
the next Salk or Pasteur as much as the next Danielle Steele,
John Grisham, or Theodore Geisel?395

395. Geisel is better known as Dr. Seuss; Steele and Grisham are successful
contemporary novelists.

